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Thesis Abstract 
 
Ayşe Boren, “Subjectivity and the Experience of Non-Places” 
 
This thesis aims to explore the mode of subjective experience historically 
peculiar to the post-industrial world through analyzing the role played by non-
places in transforming the individual from the producer of her own experience 
to the effect of a production process that denies her any agency. The thesis 
proceeds from the assumption that the organization of space has major 
consequences for subjective experience. Subjective experience is studied as a 
mode of relating to the world and to oneself through the mediation of various 
discourses, and actions. As forces such as industrialization, urbanization, and 
modern apparatuses of power become dominant factors in the shaping of the 
everyday life the subject yields her agency and turns into the mere function of 
an automated experience that has been constituted outside her. The mode of the 
relationship she forms with things, others, and her self becomes determined by 
these objective forces and the abstract forms they propose as mediators. In 
order to trace this abstraction of experience in space a distinction is drawn 
between the “historical space” of early modernity and the “abstract space of” 
the post-industrial world, which is defined by the balance of power between the 
“representations of space” and “representational spaces”. In the course of time, 
“representations of space” that refer to the dominant conception of space gain 
priority over the representational spaces that correspond to lived space. 
Consequently lived space and the spatial experience it generates become 
subject to the rules of conceived space. Non-places are presented as the 
extreme, but still exemplary, cases of abstract space. These places are 
characterized by the subjection of time to the rules of a repetitive and 
homogeneous space and the consequent hegemony of a frozen moment, by 
fixed identities that arise out of the annihilation of the interrelationship 
between the subject and the object, and the individual and the community.   
A theoretical study of the impact of such a mode of relating to the world on 
subjective experience is carried out. 
 iii 
 
Tez Özeti  
 
Ayşe Boren, “Öznellik ve Yer-Olmayan-Yerlerin Deneyimi” 
 
Bu tez, bireyin kendi deneyiminin üreticisi olmaktan çıkıp kendisi dışında 
işleyen bir üretim sürecinin aksi haline gelmesinde yer-olmayan yerlerin 
oynadığı rolü inceleyerek tarihsel olarak post-endüstriyel dünyaya özgü öznel 
deneyim biçimini araştırmayı amaçlar. Mekansal örgütlenmenin öznel deneyim 
üzerinde belirleyici sonuçları olduğu varsayımından ilerler. Öznel deneyim, 
çeşitli söylemler ve eylemler aracılığı ile kişinin dünyayla ve kendisiyle 
kurduğu ilişki biçimi olarak ele alınmıştır. Endüstrileşme, kentleşme, ve 
modern iktidar aygıtları gibi güçler gündelik hayatı şekillendirmekte baskın 
faktörler haline geldikçe kişi etkinliğini kaybeder ve kendisi dışında 
oluşturulmuş, otomatikleştirilmiş bir deneyimin salt işlevi haline gelir. 
Şeylerle, ötekilerle ve kendisiyle kurduğu ilişki biçimi yukarıda sözü edilen 
nesnel güçler ve aracı olarak önerdikleri soyut formlar tarafından belirlenmeye 
başlar. Deneyimin soyutlaşma sürecini mekan üzerinden izlemek amacıyla 
erken modernitenin “tarihi mekan”ı ile post-endüstriyel dünyanın “soyut 
mekan”ı arasında bir ayrım çizilmiştir. Bu ayrım, “mekan temsilleri” ile 
“temsili mekanlar” arasındaki güç dengesine dayanmaktadır. Zaman içinde, 
belirli bir dönemin baskın mekan tasavvurlarına atıfta bulunan “mekan 
temsilleri” yaşanan makana tekabül eden “temsili mekanlar” üzerinde bir 
üstünlük elde eder.    Sonuç olarak, yaşanan mekan ve bu mekanın yarattığı 
mekansal deneyim tasavvur edilmiş mekanın kurallarına tabi kılınır. Yer-
olamayan yerler, soyut mekanın uç ama yine de örnek teşkil edici durumları 
olarak sunulmaktadır. Bu yerler, zamanın kendini tekrarlayan ve türdeş bir 
mekanın kurallarına tabi kılınması ve, bunun bir sonucu olarak, donmuş bir 
anın egemenlği, ve özne ile nesne, birey ile kamu arasındaki karşılıklı ilişkinin 
yok edilmesinin ürünü olan sabitlenmiş kimlikler tarafından 
nitelendirilmektedir. Dünyayla kurulan bu tür bir ilişkinin öznel deneyim 
üzerindeki etkisi üzerine teorik bir çalışma yürütülmüştür. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
My objective in this thesis is to analyze the role non-places play in the 
transformation of subjects from participants in the constitution of their own 
experience to the objects of an experience that has been constituted outside 
them through the interplay of the social structures. Non-places are those transit 
zones such as the airports, highways, shopping malls, and refugee camps that 
are symbolically situated in opposition to “anthropological places” which are 
defined by Augé as “places of identity, of relations, and of history”1. With this 
definition of anthropological places I would agree; however, I would refrain 
from describing non-places in totally negative terms as destroying all forms of 
relations and bonds. Rather than completely disposing of the existing structures 
– either modern or traditional – they dismantle them; detaching practices, 
historical and natural elements, signs, and images from their present contexts in 
order to infuse them with different meanings that will give rise to new 
signification systems which will determine the relationships of individuals with 
themselves, others, and history.  
On the other hand, I would argue that the constant disruption of identity 
that arises out of the condition of being a passenger, and intensified through the 
accompanying flow of information, is not the final aim of these places but a 
means for forming a new mode of experience and subjectivity. Neither the 
                                                 
1 Marc Augé, Non-places: introduction to an anthropology of supermodernity (London; New 
York: Verso, 1995), 52. 
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subject nor its experience is discarded; but they are rearticulated along the lines 
of an abstract logic that borrows its terms from various practices and discourses 
such as law, commerce, institutional mechanisms of power, and 
technologically informed science. It is this new mode of experience and its 
subject that I want to analyze without either detaching non-places from their 
historical context or disregarding their particularity.   
Every social space provides its users specific representations that are 
embedded in the organization of space in the form of the structure of buildings 
and streets, in the way the city is demarcated into different parts and the 
various relationships formed between these parts, in the form of the dominant 
mode of transportation that is used, and through the distribution of markets, 
work, leisure and residing places, and symbols within the city. My intention in 
presenting all these urban relations as exhibiting specific representations of 
space is not to deny the material reality of space but to argue that the 
representations of space are neither the byproducts of a space that has been 
produced without their intervention nor are they attached to space after it has 
been constructed; but that they operate in the production process of space as 
one of the forces of production; that any social space is always already infused 
with a group of representations. 
The initial residing place of representations is the realm of thought; or 
rather, they are the products of a thought which has arisen out of the interplay 
between dominant modes of discourse and power relations; but they usually 
tend towards hiding the operations and implications of this thought rather than 
rendering it transparent. Consequently, any thought of, about, or even in space 
must inevitably proceed via these representations. This spatial thought needs 
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not to be a conscious one – in the sense that there does not exist a 
consciousness that constantly traces its own movements – rather it may, and 
usually does, surface from within daily practices, right in those actions that the 
inhabitant performs “without thinking”, since the thought she performs is 
always already given to her through the organization of space. Respectively, to 
think oneself within a space entails the replacement of oneself in the plane of 
representations and consequently to recognize oneself within this conceived 
space as its subject; this is a “misrecognition” in the sense that the subject 
comprehends herself as the source of what in actuality she is an effect. 
Since the ways of conceiving space have consequences for the way 
space is practiced, transformations in representations inevitably influence the 
way people recognize and codify their own selves and actions, together with 
their relationship with objects and others in space. Meaning that, material and 
symbolic attributes of space, which are the harbinger of a specific form of 
thought, transform the modality of experience and its subject. Consequently, in 
modernity the conscious reconstruction of space so as to reshape the nature of 
experience emerges as a very effective tool of power.  
In arguing that the discovery of the close relationship between the 
organization of space and the mode of experience is particularly a modern one 
I do not intend to dismiss pre-modern societies and forms of power as totally 
uninformed about the role of space in social formation. Rather, I am suggesting 
that the awareness of such a relationship can be turned into an effective tool 
only under certain material conditions. Only the societies which have 
undergone urbanization and industrialization and consequently realized the 
extent of changes that can be affected on space through human intervention can 
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mobilize the planning of space as a dominant apparatus of power. That is, only 
a culture which has succeeded in breaking down the organic bond between 
people and the soil to a large extent can rearticulate this relationship along 
abstract terms and  succeed in reshaping the inhabitants’ ways of seeing and 
thinking. 
Hence the ideology of the nation-state represents space as a 
homogeneous entity that is indiscriminate in all its operations towards different 
regions and cities within its boundaries which are presented to be the products 
of actual wars rather than the negotiations and contracts that take place after 
the fact, and which are consequently made the objects of various narratives that 
endow them with a quasi-sacred quality. And this representation is actualized 
in space to a certain extent through the construction of national networks of 
transportation and communication. Eventually, through her daily practices the 
subject comes to realize herself as the citizen of the nation-state. Moreover, 
such a conditioning of space, its planned qualification, is in no way an act 
restricted to state power. Indeed, any formation that strives to establish itself as 
a locus of power has to undertake the production of a new space. Thus 
commerce constructs space as an empty medium in which commodities 
circulate freely – displayed in all their beauty and alleged transparency from 
the shop windows – and at the same time configures space thoroughly 
according to the law of the commodity.  
In any case, what is at stake is a form of power that has gained 
maximum – but never total – control over the bedrocks of existence and 
experience (space and time) and thus can function very smoothly at the level of 
everyday life. Therefore, we can no longer imagine the contingent flow of daily 
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life to be the source of the structure of space. Rather, it is the other way around: 
In the contemporary world, the organization of space in accordance with 
abstract rules is what shapes the realm of the quotidian. Non-places can be 
located within this context as the sites in which a multitude of representations – 
those of the nation-state, commerce, transnational economy, law, etc. – are 
superimposed on top of each other and perfected with high technology which 
presents these places as the neutral sites of pure functionality. As such they 
cannot be perceived as displaying the exceptional cases of an otherwise 
completely different condition; but rather, they should be seen as generating 
the extreme instances of an already more or less institutionalized tendency in 
the organization of life: Namely, the objectification of subjects and the 
externalization of experience.  
Foucault defines experience as the “correlation between fields of 
knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity in a particular 
culture.”2 That is, in modernity experience cannot be thought as conditioned by 
subjects, or as the product of subjective intentions, thoughts, or behaviors; but 
rather, can only be conceived as something produced outside the subjects and 
productive of subjectivities. With social transformations such as the 
establishment of modern power relations, industrialization, and urbanization 
the subject slowly recedes from the sphere of experience as its owner and 
leaves its place to the interplay of discursive formations and power relations 
which then calls upon the subject to take up a position in relation to an 
experience that has been fabricated outside her. It is only after the fact that the 
self is obliged to enter into this abstract realm and reflect upon her self, to form 
                                                 
2 Michel Foucault, Use of Pleasure: History of Sexuality V.2 (New York: Vintage, 1986), 4. 
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a relation with her self via the representations that has been produced within it, 
in order to posit herself as the subject of an experience.  
Understood by Agamben “subjectivity is nothing other than the 
speaker’s capacity to posit him or herself as an ego, and cannot in any way be 
defined through some wordless sense of being oneself […] but only through a 
linguistic I transcending any possible experience.”3 This does not mean that in 
modernity there are no longer any experiences, but it simply means that they 
are now realized outside the individual; that today it is not plausible to define 
the subject on the basis of a mode of experience in which the “subject and the 
object are produced through one another”4. On the contrary, today, the subject 
is a mere function/object of a discursive experience which has been formed 
outside her and any agency she claims is the effect of the position to which she 
has been temporarily attached. Such a transformation in the constitution of the 
subject and the mode of experience entails the loss of a “representational mode 
of relationship” formed with the world; by which I understand the potential on 
the part of the subject to appropriate the given representations, to push them to 
their limits in order to make them livable; that is, to render them experiencible. 
But also the objectification of the thing, its being cut into a static role cut out 
by the dominant discourses which are authorized by power relations.   
But such a mode of relationship with the world is only possible when 
experience is itself a thing of the everyday. Actually the “expropriation of 
experience”, its a-humanization begins with the re-contextualization of 
experience within science as a means to knowledge and as “displace[d] … as 
                                                 
3 Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience (London; New 
York: Verso, 2007), 52.  
4  Theodor W. Adorno, Zur Metakritik (Stuttgart, 1956), 146 quoted in Martin Jay, The 
Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social 
Research 1923-50 (London: Heinemann, 1973), 70. 
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far as possible outside the individual: onto instruments and numbers”. 5  Before 
this transportation experience was considered to be precious not because it 
served an end; but simply because it was what it was: The ability to render the 
world livable; and it took its authority not from certainty, not from a claim to 
exhibit the truth of a thing-in-itself; but precisely from its power to narrate 
things and relations without violating them.6 And narration does not so much 
entail the stripping bare of the things as covering them with a thin garment that, 
in the course of time, takes their form.  
Consequently, the displacement of experience and its utilization within 
science for achieving certainty involves not only the violation of things, of the 
world; but also the fading away of the authority of the quotidian and its 
emergence as an amorphous flow that is in need of guidance from an external 
experience that is regarded to be superior to it. This violation simultaneously 
affects objects and subjects. The reification of things, their being fixed to an 
“essence”, a “nature” renders impossible on the part of the subject to get 
involved with them in a relationship of mutual deconstruction and 
reconstruction. 
Such a process of abstraction that blocks the mutual relationship 
between the thing and the self, that objectifies both, is in no way peculiar to 
modern science; but observable in all aspects of modern life which aim to give 
shape to this so-called amorphous sphere, the quotidian; to introduce it with 
what it essentially lacks: That is, order, functionality, and truth. Thus while 
science replaces experience onto instruments and numbers in order to endow 
                                                 
5 Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience (London; New 
York: Verso, 2007), 20. 
6 Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience (London; New 
York: Verso, 2007), 16.  
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life with truth, industrialization replaces it onto machines in order to transform 
experience into a means of profit and discipline, and urbanization presents 
itself as a huge mechanism which is made up of the intricate interplay between 
various discourses, documents of law and social policy, statistical surveys, 
contracts between companies, institutions, representations that tend to actualize 
themselves in space, but also machines that dissect the earth, that divide it into 
different parts with varying functions, which implement it with cables and so 
on. Consequently, the task of shaping the city life is completely abstracted 
from the flow of the everyday and displaced onto the all-encompassing domain 
called ‘urban planning’ which in the end entails the formalization of urban 
experience. “If”, in the pre-modern world, “the everyday life of labor and 
leisure gradually […] gave shape to the structure of the city, modern urban 
planning had as its goal to allow the structure of the city to give shape to 
everyday life […]”7 
In this thesis, I want to study this abstraction at work in the organization 
of space and therefore I turn my attention to non-places which exhibit the 
perfect examples of this process of abstraction. I want to analyze the means by 
which the citizen, which is already an abstract category, is stripped off from its 
particularity and transformed into a mere function of an abstract space; how in 
this narration-less space of commerce, power, and their abstract rules  
representations, signs and images communicate to the subject from afar in 
order to draw him into an imaginary realm which completes the objectification 
process of the subject; rendering a representational mode of relationship with 
the world impossible. 
                                                 
7 Stefan Jonsson, “Neither Inside nor Outside: Subjectivity and the Spaces of Modernity in 
Robert Musil’s The Man without Qualities,” New German Critique, no. 68. (Spring-Summer, 
1996): 37. 
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SPATIO-TEMPORAL PERCEPTION 
 
 
Any locus of power that seeks to create effects in the sphere of everyday life 
has to be able to institutionalize itself through the production of a space of its 
own; a space through which it can both define itself in practical and symbolic 
terms and structure the inhabitants’ relations with others, with themselves, and 
with the world, and their mode of existing in society. Through habituation of 
particular spaces the user internalizes the basic rules of the existing social 
order, which are materialized through the structure of the space and the 
practice it engenders and learns how to situate herself within the given context. 
Although, as Lefebvre suggests more than once in The Production of Space, 
the spatial practice born out of the organization of space is not exhaustive of 
the whole social practice, it plays a major role in the way people perceive their 
lives, behaviors, relations with others and themselves. Therefore, space occurs 
as one of the constituent elements of subjective experience and conversely, the 
agents of power have to be able to establish control over the construction and 
organization of space so that they can ascertain the maintenance of social 
practice and the order it engenders.  
However, space is not the sole constituent element of subjective 
experience; in order for a particular order of space to be thoroughly effective in 
the way people experience their lives it has to be allied with a specific 
conceptualization of time. In order for the habituation of a space – the 
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orientation of the subject to the obstacles and the possibilities presented 
through space – to gain meaning it has to be represented by the individual (first 
of all to herself) through a more or less coherent narrative. What really defines 
a place is not so much what it consists of as the nature of the relationships 
constituted between things and people in and through that space. And this 
weaving together, this labor of forming a relational paradigm is accomplished 
by narrativity which requires a specific conception of time in order for the 
story to unfold. Synchronization and simultaneity; the liner or circular 
development of the story; or a kind of narrativity defined by suspensions and 
gaps in time; the longitude of durations; etc… These temporal aspects 
employed by narration impose a (temporal) form upon experience and; in that 
way, give rise to qualitative changes in the construction and conception of 
subjectivity.  
Both space and time are indispensable elements of any form of 
representation and; although these two practices – the construction of space 
and the conceptualization of time – differ from each other, they reciprocally 
determine each other. What is brought forth through the ‘usage’ of a given 
space is rearticulated by the various time conceptions in use. And conversely, a 
specific mode of relation constituted with space allows the emergence of only a 
limited variety of time conceptualizations. In other words, the structuring of 
space functions as a major instrument in the organization and conceptualization 
of time.  
The distinctions drawn between the sacred and the profane, the public 
and private do not only find their concrete form in space, but the space 
produced with these oppositions in mind also creates changes in the way 
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people perceive and spend their time. Although modernity affects demarcations 
in space that are unprecedented, Lefebvre traces back the constitution of 
oppositions and the creation of demarcations in space to the production of 
absolute space; which is the religious-political space inhabited by the sacred 
and the unworldly (i.e. gods and goddesses, death, etc.) and which is 
frequented only for the special occasions of rites and rituals. These spaces, as 
they are the loci of the absolute, and the infinite – albeit never in an immediate 
way – and as they clearly separate themselves from the practice of everyday, 
underline the “finiteness in which social practice occurs, in which the law that 
practice has established holds sway”. Absolute space constitutes the exteriority 
of the socio-political, so as to draw the boundaries of the social, to guarantee 
that “social space thus remains the space of the society, of social life”8. These 
special constructions exhibit a double stance in relation to nature: They partake 
of natural space, but they transform their dependence on nature into a symbolic 
negation of it. Absolute spaces are constructed as “full” – a divine fullness – in 
opposition to nature which is in turn projected as empty.  
A resemblance can be detected between the organization of these 
religious zones and the construction of the City in opposition to the state of 
nature. Agamben argues that, chronologically no such phase as that of the 
“state of nature” really exists; but that it only emerges with the production of 
the City as a political zone. In other words, the City, as the locus of politics 
could not be founded without the fabrication of a so-called natural state that 
will always function as the threshold of order, a threshold that will be 
continuously referred to and systematically transgressed by the sovereign 
                                                 
8 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 35. 
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power.9 In a similar fashion, absolute spaces are political acts in the sense that 
they borrow elements from nature – such as “age, sex, genitality” – and 
rearticulate these along the lines of a socio-political discourse. “At once civil 
and religious, absolute space thus preserved and incorporated bloodlines, 
family, unmediated relationships – but it transposed them to the city, to the 
political state founded on the town.”10 In contrast, nature turns out to be 
“empty” in the sense that it is deprived of religious symbols and political 
significance. 
This practice of transportation and rearticulation through space also has 
affects on the perception of time. If the absolute spaces instituted a political 
order by way of their exceptional location within nature they also constituted a 
break in time. In nature time is embodied in space; everything in space “shows 
its age”. In nature birth, decadence and death exist together and, although we 
may not be able to calculate the age of every single natural thing, we know that 
all of them are the products of spatial changes with different histories – that is, 
they are the results of different durations. The agrarian production is almost 
totally dependent on this spatio-temporal order as it is the dawn and the dusk 
that determine the work hours and the seasons that determine which goods will 
be consumed and exchanged in a specific time of the year. Note that the 
agrarian society is one whose daily rhythm has not yet been interrupted by 
advanced technologies, and especially by those of transportation. It is the grand 
transformations inflicted upon space that endow a form to the flow of time and 
consequently reshape our daily experiences.  
                                                 
9 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 105-6 quoted in Bülent Diken, “From Refugee Camps to Gated 
Communities: Biopolitics and the End of the City,” Citizenship Studies 8, no. 1 (March 2004): 
88. 
10 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 48.  
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The effects generated by absolute space may not be as decisive as those caused 
by accumulation and industrialization, but they prepare the background for the 
latter to establish themselves. It is not that with the production of absolute 
space the above-mentioned organic bond with space totally ceases; people 
continue to depend on the longitude of the days, the turn of the seasons, the 
weather conditions, and in relation with those, on what the soil provides them. 
However, with the advent of these special zones a second time conception 
emerges, one which exists simultaneously with the cyclical notion of time but 
which also negates it through the introduction of the idea of a time that exceeds 
the boundaries of natural space.  
As gods and goddesses, together with the symbols they give rise to, are 
not affected by the passage of time, the places that contain them may be 
described as the worldly representatives of immortality. They are spatial 
constructions which insert a break in time through the introduction of a genuine 
time conception which does not yield to the laws of traditional time. And 
although the idea of immortality is an abstraction, once it is institutionalized 
through space it begins to form its own laws which have material consequences 
for the whole society. Above all, the production of absolute space constitutes 
one of the steps in the construction of a hierarchical social order. While those 
who have easier access to absolute space, who have more say in the 
constitution of the laws of this religious/political zone, thus those who are 
closer to the gods, occupy the higher ranks in this social order, those who have 
restricted access to and knowledge of those spaces constitute the lower levels 
of the society.  
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In this structure, the new time conception becomes a tool in the hands 
of the powerful for the control of those who occupy the lower ranks since it 
gradually gives way to the ideal of salvation in the next world – in that time-
space that transcends the worldly one – which causes people to situate 
themselves towards another reality; the ideal of eternal happiness becomes 
influential in the organization of this life as people start to perceive their 
experiences in its light which is judgmental and of which the privileged classes 
become the mediators.  
As I have mentioned above this initial demarcation in space is not the 
most radical one in terms of its socio-cultural consequences; however, it 
prepares the necessary background for fragmentations affected by 
modernization and industrialization to institutionalize themselves. According to 
Lefebvre, with modernization and industrialization the economic and political 
realms have gained primacy over the lived sphere and this has resulted in the 
subjugation of time (“that most precious element of lived experience”) to the 
laws of abstract space11 – a space in which the abstract laws of both state 
power and transnational capital reign.  
The importance of the problematic of space in the contemporary world 
is unquestionable. The incessant redrawing of the borders between nations, the 
problems introduced by globalization which seems to aim at total homogeneity 
through deepening the fragmentations (in space and life) created by 
industrialization and capitalist economy, the realization of “landed and human 
finiteness”12 which is a result of the over-consumption of resources… All these 
instances, and others, show the vitality of the problems relating to space not 
                                                 
11 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 95. 
12 Paul Virilio, City of Panic (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2005), 64. 
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just for the most powerful political agents, i.e. the state and the multinational 
corporations, but also for the unprivileged classes, who are trapped in the 
condition of a constant movement searching for a home. Yet even from this 
space-centric picture, time is not altogether absent. In the end time can never 
be annihilated; however, its subjugation to the space of power and capitalism 
gives rise to major changes in the nature of subjective experience.  
 
The departure point for the history of space is not to be found in 
geographical descriptions of natural space, but rather in the study of 
natural rhythms, and of the modification of those rhythms and their 
inscription in space by means of human actions, especially work-
related actions. It begins, then, with the spatio-temporal rhythms of 
nature as transformed by a social practice.13 
 
Hence, it is the gradual development of applied sciences and technology that 
allow the appropriation of land and transform the identity of work, together 
with the  construction of roads and vehicles (such as ships that can travel long 
distance) that bring about speed in transportation and enable the flourishing of 
trade, that the vitality of the given soil as the only source of life is diminished 
and the Western society reaches the point of producing the historical space 
which is “the space of accumulation (the accumulation of all wealth and 
resources: knowledge, technology, money, precious objects, works of art and 
symbols)”14. As the above argument by Lefebvre makes clear, these 
transformations brought upon space mainly through technical progress modify 
the rhythm of life, introducing the notion of speed. Speed, which had only a 
minor function in economies totally dependent on soil, turns into one of the 
major elements in the working of life, gradually replacing the time-demanding 
                                                 
13 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 117.  
14 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 49. 
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activities with those that depend on the capabilities of technical tools to extract 
the most out of the land in the shortest time periods possible.  
For all the exploitation and standardization it introduced, it may still be 
argued that historical space left a relatively broad margin for creativity, 
opening up new horizons and making possible to imagine what was hitherto 
unimaginable. However, the unrestricted flow of capital, goods, and symbols, 
together with the unprecedented progress reached in the realm of science and 
technology gradually leaves the way for abstract space which is first and 
foremost characterized by abstract labor and its socio-cultural implications. 
This space is defined by Lefebvre as the “dominant space of centers of power 
and wealth”15 which tries to abolish all the differences that may emerge from 
the periphery and whose main objective is homogenization; a space that is 
underlined by automation, “reproducibility,” and “repetition”.  
In a manner that seems paradoxical in the first instance, this objective to 
homogenize is carried out through dissecting the place, dividing it into 
segments and attributing a different role to each one of them. These segments 
retain an appearance of difference, but in fact, all of them are subject to the 
same law. After all, starting with the production of absolute space, localization 
has proven itself to be one of the most efficient means for controlling the 
population. Moreover, capitalism does not consist of the workings of a unified 
capital; the diffusing of the capital into all the possible corners through the 
constitution of a network of markets is a necessity for the reproduction of the 
capitalist mode of production, together with the imposed specialization in 
work.  
                                                 
15 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 49.  
 17 
Thus what we have is the dividing up of life into parts, factories, 
commerce centers and so on devoted to work; and the parks, cinemas, holiday 
villages, shopping malls etc. left for leisure and consumption; and a 
corresponding break constituted between the public and private spheres. 
Another objective of these constant fragmentations is to make visible the 
“poverty” and “dirtiness” of the unprivileged classes and to label them as 
sources of “social sickness” so as to exclude them from the centers. Such was 
the aim of the Tarlabaşı Alley that crudely separates the İstiklal Street from 
Tarlabaşı in order to guarantee that everybody knows his appropriate place in 
the social scale. 16 
These demarcations in space create an essentially split up conception of 
time that annihilates from the start any possibility of constituting a unified and 
meaningful narrative. Corresponding to the dichotomy that is constructed 
between work/leisure places, there exists a split within the modern conception 
of time that allows us to represent experience only in parts that cannot connect 
to each other. Thus, while notions such as intellect, production, and action are 
confined to the limits of work time, leisure time is supposed to be reserved for 
relaxation, enjoyment, consumption and  it implies an irrevocable “emptiness” 
that has to be filled in this or that way. But when any dialectical relationship is 
denied between the two spheres, neither joy is joy, nor intellect is intellect. 
Both of them remain partial; unnourished and unsatisfied; marking the 
individual’s identity with an irrevocable split.  
                                                 
16 The plans to transform the Tarlabaşı Street into a wide avenue date back to the 50’s. In the 
60’s and 70’s, as Tarlabaşı came to host immigrants from the lower classes, these plans were 
revived. Despite the oppositions of the Council of Monuments and some other organizations a 
plan that foresaw the construction of an avenue of 36 meters width was put to practice in 
1986. The project was completed two years later in 1988. Not only did the realization of the 
plan cause the unlawful demolishment of many historical buildings, but it also resulted in the 
isolation of the lower class people living in Tarlabaşı.     
(http://www.gmtr.com.tr/index.php?action=displayAnalizNode&ID=94&pID=33) 
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Benjamin had been one of the thinkers who had observed the effects of 
industrialization and urbanization on the nature of subjective experience. 
According to him, the devaluation of artisanal creation and its substitution by 
the repetitious labor of the assembly line had “skewed the modalities of 
experience in favor of Erlebnis rather than Erfahrung.”17  
 
[…] the two German words for experience, Erlebnis and Erfahrung, 
connote different ideas of how this historical process can occur. The 
former suggests the prereflexively registered influx of stimuli from 
without or the upsurge of stimuli, either somatic or psychic, from 
within. […] The contrasting term, Erfahrung, implies a more 
complexly mediated, historically integrated, and culturally filtered 
totalization of those stimuli into a meaningful pattern.18   
 
In a society which is informed totally by the end-oriented ratio of the assembly 
line, which can be characterized by speed that constantly shortens the durations 
and multiplies the stimuli, the modern man is left with the sole choice of 
reacting to what the moment presents. Here, a reactionary attitude is mistaken 
for a constitutive act: While the increasingly automized life under the 
conditions of industrialism and urbanism bring forth the objective powers as 
the real subjects of social and urban experience, the subject still takes his acts 
and thoughts as the constitutive elements of this experience.  
More than anything else the modern city is characterized by a 
continuous network of communication and transportation. Yet, first of all, this 
continuity in space is only partial; it is based upon the exclusion of the 
periphery, the intentional inhibition of the circulation of the disadvantaged of 
the city. Subject to the laws of globalization, the metropolis is structured in 
such a way as to guarantee the accumulation of capital, and commodities in the 
                                                 
17 Martin Jay, “Songs of Experience: Reflections on the Debate over Alltagsgeschichte,” in 
Cultural Semantics: Keywords of Our Time (London: The Athlone Press, 1998), 45. 
18Martin Jay, “Songs of Experience: Reflections on the Debate over Alltagsgeschichte,” in 
Cultural Semantics: Keywords of Our Time (London: The Athlone Press, 1998), 44. 
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centers, while at the same time restricting the mobility of the people. Thus 
Kadir Topbaş, the mayor of Istanbul, declares that the demand coming from the 
peripheries for public transport to Taksim will not be met. If the demand were 
to be met, he proposes, the traffic would be totally blocked.  
However, it is not only the disadvantaged of the city who are trapped in 
immobility in the middle of that restlessly mobile space. The continuity of the 
city distracts that of time. Despite the constant flow of people, goods, money 
and signs this space is, in a way, frozen in terms of time. As one modality of 
experience (Erfahrung) leaves the way for another (Erlebnis), the historical 
aspect of subjective experience is slowly annihilated. In that rush to react to the 
overabundance of stimuli, experience turns into something with no past and no 
future; something that is confined to the limits of the present moment.  No 
instance, no singular event connects to the others in order to form a narrative, 
just as the subject no longer connects to a communal context that functions 
both as the generator of a collective meaning and as the background against 
which differences become visible. The gradual unfolding of a narrative in time 
through the deployment of various temporal forms that mark the events with 
significance is replaced by the repetition of identical moments bearing 
multifarious images, signs, and events whose significance last only until the 
emergence of the next event. Time loses its identity as the bedrock of 
experience and becomes the sum total of identical moments, and hours that can 
be calculated by clocks. 
Members of the Frankfurt School, and especially Horkheimer and 
Adorno, had criticized positivism for dismissing the mediation between the 
subject and the object, the ongoing dialectical process in social life, and 
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representing social life as an agglomeration of immediate social “facts” which 
are complete in themselves and have no relationship with the other, equally 
self-contained facts. Horkheimer had argued that the positivist emphasis on the 
immediate – passed off as fact – had resulted in the “abdication of reflection”19 
since this kind of an outlook had rejected the validity of anything that goes 
beyond mere presence and in this way had encouraged the overseeing of the 
dialectical “interplay between the particular and the universal, of moment 
[Jay’s note: Das moment in German means a phase or aspect of a cumulative 
dialectical process] and totality”20 underneath the surface of immediacy.  
These criticisms became more urgent as the positivist representations of 
social life slowly descended down from the realm of thought to that of practice 
and started to determine the modality of experience. Adorno had seen the 
tendency to “reify the given” encouraged by positivism as closely “related to 
[…] the destruction of Erfahrung”21. The annihilation of the “force field”22 – 
the space of mediation in the terminology of Adorno – between the subject and 
the object implied the rejection of any possibility of historical change and the 
subject’s imprisonment within a repetitive time.  
Virilio defines the real time of globalization as “hysterical” and 
comments that “the time needed for reflection is outdone; the time of the 
conditioned reflex is the order of the day…”23 Non-places, as the ultimate 
instances of modern space, present the extreme cases of this erosion of 
                                                 
19 Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the 
Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (London: Heinemann, 1973), 62.   
20 Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the 
Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (London: Heinemann, 1973), 54. 
21Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute 
of Social Research, 1923-1950 (London: Heinemann, 1973), 70. 
22Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute 
of Social Research, 1923-1950 (London: Heinemann, 1973), 69.    
23 Paul Virilio, City of Panic (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2005), 52. 
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reflection. The seemingly unified and self-contained image these places present 
of themselves can only be achieved at the expanse of the subject’s detachment 
from her identity. Severing the individual from her past and future, entrapping 
her in the instantaneity of the messages and signs, replacing the objects of 
memory with high-tech devices that transmit institutional and commercial 
images of the subject herself, these places substitute the constantly changing 
identity of the individual with an abstract and stable ‘humanness’.  
While the individual is present to herself in all the messages and signs 
transmitted to her, she is lost to herself in terms of her social relations, her past 
and memory. The high-tech devices characterize these places. First of all, they 
give the impression that the ultimate point of progress has been reached which 
is a point that permits neither narrativity nor history to enter into the sphere of 
life. Nothing historical is accepted to the non-places unless it is transformed 
into a commodity. In addition to the exclusion of history, these places defined 
by high technology and speed, hide the fact that their functioning depends on 
the production of very dense networks on both the surface and the depths of the 
earth (and the outer space should also be remembered) which creates the 
illusion that everything takes place here and now.  
Thus, the individual’s detachment from the past, her identity and social 
relations, together with the endless stimuli that forces her to react 
instantaneously, leaves the individual neither time nor content to reflect upon. 
The result is a life that is made up of repetitive parts underlined by a loss of 
narrative. In a letter addressed to Lowenthal Horkheimer writes the following 
about the culture industry:  
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You will remember those terrible scenes in the movies when some 
years of a hero’s life are pictured in a series of shots which take about 
one or two minutes, just to show how he grew up or old, how a war 
started and passed by, a[nd] s[o] o[n]. This trimming of an existence 
into some futile moments which can be characterized schematically 
symbolizes the dissolution of humanity into elements of 
administration.24    
 
A schema imitates historical change but in actuality what takes place is the 
resignation of the subject to a narrative-less and automized reality that 
reorganizes subjective experience according to the criteria of governability. 
What Horkheimer observes in the movies, Sennett observes in relation to the 
experience of labor in the post-industrial era: The division of life into easily-
administrable and disconnected parts which increases efficiency and 
profitability in the workplace while “corroding character” on all the fronts of 
life. Sennett suggests that besides the global marketplace and the new 
technologies, it is the “new ways of organizing time” which defines the 
capitalism of the post-industrial world. The motto “No long term” clearly 
expresses the features of this new ways of organizing work time25: Rather than 
pursuing long-term careers people are transported from one task to another 
which have little affinity with each other; consequently easy adaptability to the 
skills every different task necessitates becomes more valuable for survival than 
past experience and the wisdom it may bestow; dispersible teams are appointed 
to these tasks, members of these teams remain attached to each other only until 
another project is defined which is to be pursued by a reorganized team.  
                                                 
24 Max Horkheimer, Letter to Lowenthal (October 14, 1942) quoted in Martin Jay, The 
Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social 
Research, 1923-1950 (London: Heinemann, 1973), 214. 
25 Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the 
New Capitalism (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 22. 
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“Management wants now to think of organizations as networks”26; 
meaning that, according to the changing array of interests and needs, the chains 
in the network can disconnect and reconnect to each other without difficulty. 
All this indicates that the long-term that is needed for making up the content of 
a life story, of relations with the self and with others is dismissed as 
dysfunctional. Yet, on another plane, organizing time in this way is more 
harmful than profitable. One of the people Sennett talks to while doing 
research for his book, Rico, tries to explain “that the material changes 
embodied in the motto ‘No long term’ have become dysfunctional for him […], 
but as guides to personal character”. When transported to the sphere of 
personal life, the qualities needed for surviving in the new economy turn into 
traps that imprison people in static presences. So the question arises: “How can 
a human being develop a narrative of identity and life history in a society 
composed of episodes and fragments?”27 
It is not that non-places totally annul the possibility of forming a 
meaningful and unified narrative; but they turn it into a painful task that can 
either never be fulfilled or miraculously fulfilled against all the odds, including 
the subject herself. Actually, non-places have become one of the settings for 
contemporary literature. Tim Parks’ novel Destiny presents an example of this 
and it is so thoroughly marked with the fragmented character of the non-places 
that what the reader witnesses is mainly the endless effort of the anti-hero to 
think. In a constant movement, going from the hotel to the airport, flying and 
again landing in a transitory spot, Chris Burton tries very hard not to let the 
                                                 
26 Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the 
New Capitalism (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 23. 
27  Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the 
New Capitalism (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 26. 
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most delicate and important matters of his life (his son’s suicide, his marriage, 
etc.) to be effected in the same way as his body from the incredible speed of 
time. It seems that the literature of non-places is an answer to the contemporary 
belief that life can only continue through the sacrifice of narrativity. 
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THE ACTUALIZATION OF REPRESENTATIONS OF SPACE 
 
 
Lefebvre draws a demarcation line between representations of space and 
representational spaces. Although these two notions and their various modes of 
relation constitute one of the thick and continuous layers of the whole text, 
simply defined, representations of space designate the dominant conception of 
space within a specific historical period which arises out of the collaboration 
between knowledge and power (basically, the dominant mode of power, i.e. the 
state, and the prevailing mode of production). As Lefebvre argues these 
representations are “shot through with knowledge”, yet this knowledge by 
definition tends towards ideology since it serves the aims of power. This 
ideological form of knowledge enables power to diffuse into the everyday 
realm, transforming it from something imposed from above into a daily 
practice. In this process of transformation knowledge itself is overturned: 
Losing its critical dimension it becomes a techno-knowledge of achieving 
specified goals. Setting itself apart from and claiming a higher authority than 
that of lived experience, this form of knowledge produces a discourse on 
capabilities rather than on potentialities.  
As the products of a knowledge intertwined with power; in all of their 
historical manifestations, these representations have as their objective the 
controlling of phenomena through techniques such as categorization, 
classification, and abstraction all of which tend towards reducing the 
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phenomenon to a static and one-dimensional identity. Lefebvre defines this 
space as “the space of all those who identify what is lived and what is 
perceived with what is conceived”28; that is, represented. Thus as observed in 
the modern representations of space (plans, projections, maps) the multilayered 
reality of life is reduced to two-dimensional drawings which do not only 
disregard the lived but also substitute it with what is conceived. A walk in the 
city with its detours, experiences, and events is substituted with street names 
and signs, and the dweller who confronts obstacles and amusements, who 
hesitates and changes her way; in short; she, who weaves herself a path, is 
replaced by a figure in a sketch that follows signs.  
Representational spaces, on the other hand, correspond to “lived space”. 
It is “the space of ‘inhabitants’”29 and as such it is both the locus of an 
imagination that embodies the possibility of producing a different space and 
the object of the reductive operations of the representations of space. The 
analysis of the ways the representations of space become totally detached from 
the representational spaces within an overall context of capitalist accumulation 
and the effects of such a divorce on subjective experience constitutes one of the 
aims of this paper.  
According to Michel de Certeau representations of space are the 
products of a vision that situates itself up above and gazes coldly without either 
touching or being touched. As distanced as they are from the experience of the 
street, they lose connection with all the senses except vision, which 
“transforms the bewitching world by which one was ‘possessed’ into a text that 
                                                 
28 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 38. 
29 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 39. 
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lies before one’s eyes.”30 This allusion to a text that is meant to be deciphered 
and not lived first of all transports the urban experience from the realm of life 
to that of a knowledge detached from practice. Marshall McLuhan explains that 
the written text by definition implies the privileging of the sense of vision 
because it projects the multidimensional experience of life that emerges out of 
the interplay among all the senses onto a flat plane that is meaningful only in 
relation to the eye. This kind of a translation entails a reduction in the sense 
that it remains indifferent to the experiences that are presented by the other 
senses. 
In this process whereby vision, and together with it the visible, exert 
their hegemony all other senses lose their validity. While the spoken word is 
not only addressed to the ear but also touches the body – it warns against 
danger, repels or arouses, and so on -; the written word is meant solely for the 
eye that in the moment of reading turns into a point of view. In contrast to the 
oral language which is indicative of a simultaneity that embraces all the layers 
of meaning at a time and forms various constellations of emphasis (shifts of 
emphasis occur without leaving out the elements that are attributed less 
importance), writing is a linear system that imposes homogeneity on meaning. 
It carries the layers that are piled up on top of one another to a surface that 
retains an equal distance towards all elements. Intensity of the body is 
substituted with a sequence that the eye can follow; and moreover, this vision, 
just because of its equal distance in respect to the elements and its ability to 
follow, is supposedly endowed with a rationality capable of judging.   
                                                 
30 Michel de Certeau, “Walking in the City,” in The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984), 92.  
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Therefore, one of the most important consequences of this line of 
thought is that through attributing primacy to only one of the senses (i.e., 
vision) it subtracts the total body from the experience of space; as if space 
could emerge without the interplay of the bodies; or, as if the act of seeing was 
the prerequisite of both the body and its space. It is true that vision, together 
with the language that carries it to the fore, participate in the production 
process of space; however, by themselves, they are powerless. Or, to express it 
in other words, to set vision as an autonomous force in the production process 
of space serves to the impoverishing rather than to the enrichment of urban 
experience. To subjugate social practice, and together with it the spatial 
practice that it embodies, to the laws of vision means to render the fluidity of 
life immobile. It is only with the aid of other senses that sight can reach out to 
the object emphatically31; without their guidance it knows only to fix the thing 
in place so that it does not slide away from its framework and leave its domain 
of control.  
The dissociation of the sense of vision from the audile-tactile world 
implies its divorce from the body: Now, as it is dislocated from the body, 
vision has to find itself a new residing place and it turns out to be static point. 
Such a residing place seems to be shared by both perspective and chronological 
writing which are interrelated phenomena whose identifying character is the 
consistency of a “point of view”. In fact, this very consistency and stability of a 
viewpoint is what imposes a semi-illusionary/semi-real stability on the content 
(i.e. spatial practice) itself. A linear progression flowing from a fixed point 
operates in such a way that the forthcoming element (the word, sentence, 
                                                 
31 Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1962), 37.
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building or the event itself which is represented on a syntactical lineal basis) 
should prepare the grounds for the following element; this kind of narration 
cannot tolerate any ambiguity that will erode the coherence of the text/structure 
as it is what endows the text in question with meaning. Thus, it becomes 
apparent that the chronological narrative, or perspective in general (in 
architecture, arts, etc.) for that matter, as a form, can only maintain a strictly 
formal relationship with its content: It either assimilates all the phenomena to 
its framework, assigning all of them a fixed place, or excludes altogether that 
which exceeds the limits of its paradigm – in the sense of a conceptual 
framework composed of well-defined rules – and thus threatens its validity. 
Such a reductive attitude stands in contrast to the simultaneous forms of 
meaning that take into consideration the whole network of relationships in all 
their complexity and which endow value not so much to consistency but to the 
peculiarity of the world created by the body.   
To be sure, to assign the whole responsibility to that discourse that 
severs knowledge from lived experience and authorizes a language as the 
beholder of truth and the engenderer of space would be a reductive attitude 
itself. This immobilization and reduction generated by words (as signs), 
concepts and representations can be this effective only after the invention of 
print and only as the elements of more comprehensive socio-economic and 
cultural transformations; namely capitalist industrialization, bureaucracy, and 
the institutionalization of the nation state. I will return to the impact of this 
“visual formant” later in the context of non-places. But for now, what I want to 
emphasize is that the representations of space, as by definition they “tend […] 
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towards a system of verbal signs”32, introduce abstraction into the sphere of the 
body and transport it from the realm of the lived to that of the conceived.   
Lefebvre argues that although in general we cannot talk of a “code of 
space”, some periods in history, such as the period that gave rise to the 
Renaissance town, could generate a specific code of space which is observable 
in the spatial practice and organization of that society. By a “code of space” 
what is referred to is a language that is capable of representing the urban reality 
out of which it has arisen. The production of this common language first of all 
depends on the recognition of the town as a unified subject that plays an active 
role in the production process rather than as the sum total of isolated spatial 
elements. It is only with such a consciousness of totality that a relational 
paradigm between the various elements of space can be formed.  
Such a code is formed by the forces of production available and it finds 
expression usually in the conceptions (representations) of space rather than 
through the representational spaces. Once the spatial code of the Renaissance 
town was established, “‘people’ – inhabitants, builders, politicians – stopped 
going from urban messages to the code in order to decipher reality, to decode 
town and country, and began instead to go from code to messages, so as to 
produce a discourse and a reality adequate to the code.”33 This code is of 
course the product of practice; and in this respect it has nothing abstract about 
it: Rather than being an idea imposed from above it is realized in space through 
the daily routine of the inhabitants (thus Lefebvre mentions that perspective, 
which is one of the major defining spatial elements of this period, is actualized 
through the organization of the streets and the façades, and thus, it becomes a 
                                                 
32 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 39. 
33 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 47. Italics 
are mine. 
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reality of social life). However, there exists an institutional gap between the 
semi-unconscious acts of the inhabitants (and the builders and politicians) that 
give rise to the code and the resulting consciousness of the code. What I mean 
is that, to the extent that the code of the Renaissance town is institutionalized it 
tends to sever itself from the everyday practice and it eventually adopts an 
autonomous identity.  
This institutionalized code, becomes the real subject of the town, and 
from that moment on it begins to organize the urban experience of the 
inhabitants. What is decisive in this context is that the transfer of authority in 
regard to the constitution of urban experience from the direct users of that 
space to a totalizing code – and to those who had participated in a more 
cognizant fashion in the production of this code – also entails the substitution 
of the heterogeneity and opacity of the lived experience by the homogeneity 
and the illusionary transparency of a conceived reality. When considered in its 
historical context, it can be argued that such a code was revolutionary in 
character. And indeed it was. The substitution of random acts by conscious 
ones opened the way for inventions and progress, for the accumulation of 
wealth and knowledge. However, it also opened the way to the separation of 
the representations of space from representational spaces which could be 
actualized in totality only with the advent of the abstract space (actually this 
separation is a constitutive element in the production of abstract space). As we 
will see the autonomy achieved by the representations of space will give rise to 
a violence that is as conscious as the plans and projects themselves.   
Representations of space present the space they are conceptualizing as 
enclosed structures; as completed, and thus, stable in nature. In actuality, this is 
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the outcome of the projection of the very rigidity of these representations 
themselves onto the lived space. Urban planning, that sector which plays the 
leading role in the actualization of the representations of space in modernity, 
proceeds with the rules of conceived space and in order to render itself valid it 
imposes these rules to lived space itself. In other words, in order to render the 
rules of conceived space applicable to the real, living space, the latter is 
portrayed as a simple reflection of the former: The exactitude and strictness of 
the plans and projects are attributed to spatial practice itself, as if the conceived 
space was the generator of social space.  
In this process, the alive aspects of spatial practice such as interaction, 
conflict, and negotiation are either totally dismissed from attention, or, if and 
when they are taken into consideration, evaluation remains strictly within the 
limits of a quantitative analysis: They are calculated just like the lengths of the 
buildings, and the width of the avenues are calculated. Or it may be that the 
reverse is true; that in abstract space, and especially in non-places, the above-
mentioned calculations are perfected to achieve such a quality that the spatial 
practice is transformed into a sum of data that can be easily calculated, so as to 
create a kind of “economy of space” (what Lefebvre defines as “spatial 
economy”34).   Meaning that the (quantitative) quality of the airports, 
highways, shopping malls, the exact application of the plans to social space – 
in certain very poor examples this application becomes so ignorant of the 
human factor that it becomes threatening; such is the case in the Cevahir 
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shopping center35 – erodes the quality of spatial practice and reduces its 
dynamic character to the static character of plans.  
Yet, unlike the designs and plans of the urban designers and architects 
which design the urban realm as a static, empty medium that can accept 
whatever is imposed upon it; the space of the users is a fluid one that defies the 
stabilization of a cold look that fixes everything it sees in a place; and reduces 
the multidimensional, and “opaque” reality of the urban life that is informed by 
the interplay between all the senses to the transparency and stability of a sheet 
of paper. This fluidity derives from the body which constitutes the condition of 
possibility of space. Against the representation of space as an empty container 
with no specific relationship to what it contains, Lefebvre argues that “the body 
with the energies at its disposal, the living body, creates or produces its own 
space; conversely, the laws of space, which is to say the laws of discrimination 
in space, also govern the living body and the deployment of its energies”.36  
This means that space (either the space of nature or a social space) exists prior 
to the entrance of a particular body and thus, the existence of certain rules and 
laws concerning the use and occupation of this space that cannot be easily 
overthrown by it cannot be denied.  
Still, the space we are referring to is neither the product of a will that 
exceeds in power the limits of social reality nor of representations (although 
they play an important role) but of a bodily, “active occupation” by prior 
bodies that shape their bedrock of existence through the energies they dispose, 
                                                 
35 The Cevahir Shopping Center which is situated in Şişli, İstanbul has been opened in 
15.10.2005 as the biggest shopping mall of Turkey. Within a few months, it became the scene 
of two deaths. A three years-old girls, and two weeks later a boy of 16, have lost their lives by 
falling from the moving stairways. In reply to the criticisms that the banisters were shorter 
than they had to be, a member of the executive board said: “They are not short. The latest 
technology was used here.” (http://www.nethaber.com/Haber/6653/Cevahir-Alisveris-
Merkezinde-dun-bir)  
36Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 170. 
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and the marks and traces they inscribe; in short, bodies that “qualify”37 their 
space. The particular body is born into this already socialized space, yet this 
does not mean that it is entrapped within the unshakeable laws of a once and 
for all established space that remains unaffected by the actions of the body. 
Rather, the qualification process is perpetual. Space, as the locus of 
possibilities whose number and identity cannot be easily predicted, is 
constantly rearticulated through the practices of the spatial body. Qualification 
and spatial practice entail a body that at times aims at breaking the given rules, 
at other times multiplies the possibilities provided by space, and still at others, 
actualizes the given rules without too much resistance. Total conformity to the 
rules that govern a social space is in actuality only an ideal state which can 
never constitute the whole of spatial practice, but can only be valid for places 
with specific characteristics.  
Representations of space operate through transforming a process of 
becoming, an unfolding in time with its detours, various configurations, and 
ruptures into a “presence” with a static identity. This constant presence does 
not only assimilate the past and the future to its own system of meaning but it 
also demands a reification, a materiality that will ensure the continuity and 
validity of this system throughout time. In other words, historicity is 
imaginarily defeated by way of concrete works that, through their durability 
and the institutional power they are imbued with, constantly reaffirm the truth 
of an absolute presence. To give an example, monuments may be perceived as 
the important components of a spatial organization that is both embedded in the 
social order and also functioning as one of the primary media that facilitate the 
                                                 
37Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 174. 
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reproduction of that order. Monuments are constructed with the principle of 
resisting the effects of both history and nature and in that sense they mark the 
social order they are signifying with an imaginary transcendence over time; 
they represent it as an eternal system and consequently provide it with both a 
symbolic and material basis of legitimacy – ‘that which transcends time is 
universally valid’.  
Relatively, a kind of knowledge that situates itself within these 
representations claims to be the natural reflection of such a static presence with 
clear-cut boundaries and definite qualities. This kind of a knowledge that is 
blind to the dynamics of lived experience organizes its object in such a manner 
that all phenomena emerge as the constituent parts of a supposedly essential 
structure, all of them assigned a proper place. Within such a context, all 
phenomena are reduced to the differently disguised manifestations of the same 
essential truth. In other words, such a knowledge does not only assert the 
superiority of an abstract and unchanging reality over lived experience but also 
projects the thing/being as a simple element with no significance and meaning 
apart from being a part and sustaining the validity of the whole. Consequently, 
it can be argued that the representations of space and the corresponding form of 
knowledge are nourished from sameness, rather than otherness and difference. 
Such an argument does not imply that these representations are immune 
to change. On the contrary, representations are the products of history and have 
nothing essential about them. The main conception of space valid for the 
Renaissance town is utterly different from that of the twentieth century 
Western city; representations had already an impact on the conceptualization 
and experience of space before the invention of maps, plans and projects. 
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However, because representations have a general inclination towards 
institutionalization; in other words, because “their intervention occurs by way 
of construction, … by way of architecture … as a project embedded in a spatial 
context and a texture which call for representations that will not vanish into the 
imaginary or symbolic realms”38 they tend to persist and present themselves as 
everlasting in contrast to an ever-changing and unstable everyday life. This 
does not mean that contradictory views or different paradigms are totally 
eliminated from such an institutionalized knowledge; yet these different 
perspectives do not question the identity of knowledge as they are still 
presented in the form of perspectives that can operate only through the 
reduction of the quality of life; they are safely located within the same system 
of thought.39  
In contrast to the sameness that the representations develop upon, the 
body emerges as the locus of difference; first, because of its potentiality to give 
rise to a space (its own space) and to implant new possibilities in this space; 
and secondly because of its embeddedness in a qualitative time. Space and time 
are interrelated phenomena whose conceptual divorce cannot take place 
without effecting a reduction in the qualities of both. The body deploys its 
energies within a specific space in concordance with the rules of that space, 
yet, at the same time, this body marks its own space with a temporality through 
the rhythms of its space-producing actions – such as gestures. And in doing so 
                                                 
38 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 42. 
39 Here, I have in mind the distinction Lefebvre draws between “induced and produced 
differences” in The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 372: 
 
An induced difference remains within a set or system generated according to 
a particular law. [...] the diversity between villas in a suburb filled with villas; 
or between different ‘community facilities’.... By contrast, a produced 
difference presupposes the shattering of a system; it is born of an explosion; 
it emerges from the chasm opened up when a closed universe ruptures. 
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it strips the space in question of its illusory stability and opens it up to 
transformation; diverse rhythms give rise to different spaces, varying time 
sequences present different modes of interconnecting the spatial elements and 
thus articulate spatial experience in different modes. Either in the form of 
rhythms that qualify a spatial act or in the form of modes of temporal 
articulation that open spatial practice to narrativity, it is temporality that 
sustains the continuity of spatial experience. However, the continuity of spatio-
temporal experience is radically different from that imposed by representations 
and signs.  
Representations present continuity in the form of an abstract pattern that 
recurs throughout history, without being affected by this history. It could be 
argued that this form of continuity is equivalent to stability: The stability of the 
social order that is sustained by way of the material forms and products of the 
dominant conception of space such as urban planning, architectural plans, 
signs, and which is enacted, and thus perpetually reaffirmed, by the daily 
practices of the inhabitants. As I have discussed above, ideologies tend to 
institutionalize themselves in space, to carve out a proper place for themselves 
with clear-cut boundaries, in order to guarantee their authority in the 
construction and control of social life: Expressed simply, the permanence of 
the place is mistaken for the truth value of the ideology, or the system. Such an 
ideological logic subjugates time to the rules of its spatial determinations; the 
result is a rigid space that acts more as an imposer of abstract rules than as a 
locus of experience. And time, under the reign of this ideological logic, is 
deprived of its inherent elements such as ruptures, breaks, and different turns 
and reduced to a lineal narrative that echoes the power of this spatial authority. 
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Poly-rhythmic gestures that give rise to diversity are replaced by mono-
rhythmic ones that put the emphasis on senseless repetition and produce 
nothing but homogeneity. Paradoxically, what is arrived at is a time conception 
that disregards the dynamics of time.  
To think of subjective experience as totally unaffected by the spatio-
temporal determinations and conceptualizations of modernity is impossible 
since both the subject and its experience are the products of the modernist 
system of thought. The notion of experience privileges the subject and endows 
it with a consciousness (and intentionality) that transgresses the constructive 
power of institutional techniques and procedures. Also, the term implicitly 
indicates the power of the subject to retain its identity under all circumstances: 
“The apparent continuity (in consciousness) of subjective experience; the 
tendency of the subject to maintain the same I in all encounters; its ability to 
penetrate into everything and to internalize everything”40 To this extent, a 
similarity between the time of conceived space and the time perception of the 
experiencing subject can be detected: it can be argued that the tendency of the 
subject to sustain its identity does not so much contradict on the conceptual 
level with the sameness promoted by the representations. However, such an 
argument misses the point that lived space does not so much refer to a ready-
made space that is received indifferently by the subject, as to a reciprocal 
relationship between the space and the subject in which experience plays the 
role of the mediator: the subject appropriates space in order to create its space 
and in this process of appropriation it is not only space but also the subject that 
is reconstituted. Thus, it is appropriation rather than assimilation that 
                                                 
40 Orhan Koçak, “Melih Cevdet: İkinci Yeniden Sonra,” Defter, no: 14 (July- November 
1990): 23.  
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characterizes experience; the experiencing subject – the conscious body (‘I’) 
that produces space through its experiences – is not a self-contained entity with 
pre-determined boundaries. On the contrary, experience is not really possible 
without the challenging of limits, as it indicates the collapse of the barriers 
between the subject and the object.  
The experiencing subject is deeply situated within a qualitative time: 
Despite the high value attributed to the present moment in experience, the 
temporal situatedness (and awareness) of the subject prevents it from rendering 
this moment absolute, from being stuck in it. The importance of the present 
moment derives from its power to influence the perception of the subject in 
relation to both the past and the future. In that moment when the subject 
encounters that which had been unknown hitherto, the limits of its identity – 
limits in terms of prejudices, values, and manners – are eroded in order to come 
to terms with this new thing, in order to be able to get into a reciprocal 
relationship with it that will eventually reconstitute both the object and the 
subject. In this process the subject’s position in relation to her past and future 
also changes: the past becomes perceived under a new light, layers of it which 
had been previously unrecognized come to the fore, and memories change 
shape in order to give rise to a new configuration with new meanings. 
At this point recourse to Benjamin on experience would be helpful in 
order to qualify the notion of experience that I have been referring to. 
Benjamin’s thought on experience is significant in this context because he 
emphasizes the intricate interconnections between experience, time, narrativity, 
memory and place. The recognition of these connections allows an 
understanding at least of what is lacking in abstract space – in that space of 
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industrial accumulation and abstract labor, of repetition and exchange, of 
organizational rules, and institutional power – and the impact of such a 
subtraction on the quality of experience.  
Benjamin perceives memory as “a mode of relating to the past that” 
does “not claim the ability to recapture retrospectively the entirety of what had 
preceded the present as if it were a single coherent plot”.41 This is a kind of 
remembrance that retains the “aura” of the past which is defined in relation to 
(natural) things “as the unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may 
be.”42 What is indicated by this phenomenon of distance radically differs from 
that which arises out of the fixing gaze of the expert which exerts the 
domination of the subject over the object. The acknowledgement of this spatio-
temporal distance does not give rise to an irrecoverable split between the 
subject and the object (in this case, the past) that annihilates the possibility of 
any kind of relationship other than that of domination between the two; but 
rather enables multiple modes of productive and imaginative relationships to 
flourish between then and now, here and there. Experience of the past is 
possible only when the subject recognizes it not as a self-contained entity, or a 
completed story that yields itself readily to the logos of the subject but as an 
“other” which presents gaps and breaks. It is from these interstices, which 
distinguish the subject and the object but also make their interaction and 
momentary connection possible, that various stories unfold that rearticulate the 
past, but also the future.  
                                                 
41 Martin Jay, “Lamenting the Crisis of Experience: Benjamin and Adorno,” in Songs of 
Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme (Berkeley; 
Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 2005), 335. 
42 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in 
Illuminations, ed. Hanna Arendt (London: Fontana Books, 1973), 224.   
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The realization that even the past which had been thought to be 
immobile can turn out to be open to constant reconfiguration marks the future 
as totally indefinite, as the locus of unanticipated possibilities that defy all 
plans and projects. The future emerges as a source of anxiety, as the bedrock of 
uncertainties which also harbors the possibility of a total loss, of the 
annihilation of the subject. This is exactly why the subject cannot remain 
identical with itself in a frozen moment. In order to overcome this anxiety, in 
order to convert the negative potential to a positive one, the subject has to 
produce meaning through experiences that can be translated into narratives that 
will not entrap the self within rigid boundaries but constantly rearticulate its 
identity in relation to both the past and the future. Consequently, it is not that 
the subject sustains its identity despite the changes produced by experience; on 
the contrary, identity can be constituted only through transformative 
experiences.  
To be able to forget, but not to lose the self, in order to reach out to the 
other; to allude to a memory that does not nourish from the official and assert 
the domination of the subject over the object; to build up a historical identity 
interwoven with stories, all of these seem to be elements that make up 
experience which Benjamin defines as the “uniform and continuous 
multiplicity of knowledge”.43 What Benjamin offers is a form of knowledge 
that seeks meaning rather than coherence; an experience that can be transmitted 
to others through narratives, which will thus become the property of a 
community and be the subject of multiple interpretations and different modes 
of articulation. In other words, what is proposed is a form of knowledge that is 
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neither limited to the sphere of concepts nor to those subjects who, by way of 
their position, have access to this sphere but a “differential knowledge”44 that is 
open to the contributions of all spheres and supports the constant reconstitution 
of meaning. Such a knowledge will let culture to produce ever new alternatives 
rather than to recede into a sum of normative rules and fruitless stereotypes. 
Thus, Benjamin explains how this continuation and enrichment of culture is 
provided through narratives which he locates at the very center of his 
philosophy of experience: 
 
In every case the storyteller is a man who has counsel for his readers. 
But if today ‘having counsel’ is beginning to have an old-fashioned 
ring, this is because the communicability of experience is decreasing. 
In consequence we have no counsel either for ourselves or for others. 
After all, counsel is less an answer to a question than a proposal 
concerning the continuation of a story which is just unfolding. To seek 
this counsel one would first be able to tell the story.45  
 
Experience is a journey46 traveled not only in time but also in a space 
by bodies which qualify their space. Spatial differentiation, which constitutes a 
part of this qualification practice, can be traced back to the initial encounter of 
the child with her own image reflected on the mirror. The symbolic role this 
special object plays in the constitution process of the subject is frequently 
emphasized by not only psychoanalysts but also other social theorists who deal 
with the subject of identity formation. The imaginary space produced through 
the reflective surface of the mirror exhibits to the child her detachment from 
                                                 
44 I borrow the adjective “differential” from Lefebvre who uses the term “differential space” 
in order to indicate a space which will arise out of the inherent contradictions of abstract 
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the mother; symbolically marking the passage from an indifferentiation –unity 
with the mother – to the recognition of the self as a separate entity. In other 
words, the mirror stage initiates a process whereby the child will eventually 
come to know herself as an ‘I’; meaning that she will gain a consciousness of 
her identity as differentiated from but still relationally dependent on the other, 
which is not only an image but also a space exceeding the boundaries of her 
own space (i.e., her body).  
“The departure of the mother…” which is symbolically accomplished 
through the mirage-effect, “constitutes localization and exteriority against the 
background of an absence”.47 Consequently, the recognition of the other 
emerges as the precondition of the constitution of the self. And the space that 
emerges in order to present the other to the subject constitutes the background 
upon which subsequent encounters with new objects will take place. Thus, this 
“produced difference”, the space that informs the subject of herself via the 
other prepares the way for the production of other differences.  
 
The mirror is a surface at once pure and impure, almost material yet 
virtually unreal; it presents the Ego with its own material presence, 
calling up its counterpart, its absence from – and at the same time its 
inherence in – this ‘other’ space. Inasmuch as its symmetry is 
projected therein, the Ego is liable to ‘recognize’ itself in the ‘other’, 
but it does not in fact coincide with it: ‘other’ merely represents ‘Ego’ 
as an inverted image in which the left appears at the right, as a 
reflection which yet generates an extreme difference. […] Here what 
is identical is at the same time radically other, radically different – and 
transparency is equivalent to opacity. 48 
 
Space is endowed with an identity through the practices of spatial 
qualification that are continually re-acted. However, as much as the singular 
body emerges as the qualifier of space, the essential task of identity 
                                                 
47Michel de Certeau, “Walking in the City,” in The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984), 109. 
48 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 184-5. 
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construction exceeds the limits of an isolated body. Spatial qualification and 
differentiation leads to identity formation only when they are practiced by a 
communal body that does not solely expose energies or leave marks, but also 
thinks together with all of its members over the ways to organize these actions. 
Singular acts are assembled in such a way as to constitute a more or less 
coherent whole; spatial arrangements yield their arbitrary nature in order to 
become expressive of a communal identity. As indicated above the overlapping 
of all these conditions in order to give rise to a code of space, the production of 
a flawless communal practice in which almost every act finds its expression is 
a very rarely observed situation. In any case, it can be argued that on the 
communal level the production process of space becomes more complicated in 
order to give rise to a spatial practice and a discourse which both arises from 
this practice and also provides a means for thinking about it.  
Neither spatial practices nor discourses remain intact; even a code of 
space that has proven its validity over a course of time is bound to collapse 
when it cannot enhance its system of thought in order to render legible newly 
emerging spatial practices. In a similar way, practices and discourses depend 
upon narratives that will sustain them at the local level. Narratives form a 
paradigm that will connect together spatial structures, events, and acts in order 
to give rise to a meaningful practice whose subject is the community. Without 
narratives, actions and events would remain disconnected, producing abstract 
discourses which reduce the community to an agglomeration of persons, who, 
due to this abstraction from the social context, lose their ability to generate a 
collective experience, and a space that functions as the productive bedrock of 
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that experience. In a way, narratives provide a local source of legitimacy for 
discourses and practices.  
This does not imply that these narratives promote total submission to 
the rules of these discursive and non-discursive practices. They also subvert 
them in order for the inhabitants to recognize themselves in their spatial 
practices; new elements are added; others are rearticulated in order to become 
meaningful in the eyes of the local user; still others that cannot find expression 
in the local context are totally discarded from the plot of the story.  And in a 
paradoxical manner, it is not so much the confirmative aspects of the stories 
but the subversive ones that enable the continuation of a spatial practice; 
preventing it from turning into a enclosed system that will eventually dissolve: 
The work of spatial narratives is not only to provide a source of unification, 
they are also attempts to render meaningful the particularities and differences 
within the community. They do not present the identity that is formed by 
practices as a frozen entity; but rather, exhibit the contradictions inherent in 
this identity, bring out the breaks and different layers that make it up and thus, 
turn it into something that can be experienced. Through narratives, spatial 
identity becomes the work of the whole group and not something that is 
imposed from above. 
By means of these stories, spatial practice gives rise to a “recognition 
effect”49 that is similar to, but exceeding in limits, the constitutive power of the 
mirror-effect that is experienced by the individual. While the individual mirror 
symbolically triggers the constitution process of subjective identity, the 
collective one carries this process to the communal level; enabling all the 
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members to locate themselves within the spatial order – and the social order it 
implies – and participate in varying degrees to the production of identity. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the spatial practice and organization of a group 
presents clues regarding the identity of that group. However, this argument 
should not be carried far enough to give rise to the “illusion of a society so 
transparent to itself that it is fully expressed in the most trivial of its usages, in 
any one of its institutions, and in the total personality of each of its 
members.”50  
The spatial practice of a society does not express the identity of a 
society in its totality and this is so because of various reasons: First of all, what 
is called identity is not a simple entity whose codes are readily accessible to an 
analysis of spatial structure; rather it is a complicated composite of 
interpenetrating layers of practices and discourses. And secondly, the 
production of space is a complicated process in which multiple centers of 
action with varying degrees of influential power participate and the end 
product itself (i.e., space) does not usually inform about all these intertwined 
dimensions of the process itself. That is to say, “space conceals as much as it 
reveals” and therefore it may easily turn into a trap that deceives the analyst. 
Moreover, this illusion threatens to misguide not only the analyst but 
also the inhabitants of the place. In certain situations, the mirror-effect may 
turn into a weapon that threatens the formation and maintenance of identity 
rather than acting as an initiator. At the individual level, the danger of losing 
oneself in the reflected image arises if this image is mistaken for the identical 
double of the self; that is to say, if the consciousness of the other is lost. And, 
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at the communal level, to form a relationship of total identification between the 
identity of a society and its spatial order results in the acceptance of this order 
– which embeds the social order – as natural rather than as the work of specific 
forces.  
What kind of consequences does such a condition entail for the 
consciousness of the subject? Articulated in a different manner the question is: 
What happens to consciousness when the other is not recognized in its 
“otherness,” but transformed into a repetition producing no difference, a mere 
reflection that constantly refers back to the self? The most basic answer to this 
question is that the subject loses its ability to produce difference. These 
questions gain vitality in regard to abstract space which is defined by Lefebvre 
as that space in which representations of space, having gained almost total 
autonomy, exert domination over lived space; subjecting it to their formal 
rules. In this context, my specific concern is to understand what happens to the 
potentiality of the individual and the community to produce difference when 
the abstraction inherent in the representations of space is actualized in space.  
It is not only the productive practices of bodies that generate a specific 
space. In order to get a more thorough understanding of a society’s space, the 
form of production prevailing in that society has to be taken into account too. It 
is obvious that the space that is generated with the techniques and tools of 
agriculture is utterly different from the space produced by those of 
industrialism. And abstract space is a specifically industrial space for various 
reasons. As I have mentioned above, both the reign of the written word which 
fixes the thing in place and deprives experience from its complex, simultaneous 
and bodily content, and the emergence of the “quantifiable” as the major 
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criterion of reality could only be realized within an overall context of 
industrialization. The first of these late developments exhibits a somewhat 
paradoxical phenomenon: While on the one hand, writing and print technology 
participate in the construction of the autonomous subject they at the same time 
initiate a process whereby subjective experience which momentarily unites the 
subject and the object (the other that is presented by life) is replaced by a 
constant separation, which detaches the subject from her experience. As the 
demarcation line between everything that life presents for experience and the 
subject gets more rigid (and thus harder to transgresses) experience becomes 
increasingly formalized and the subject is gradually rendered contentless; 
reduced to a form that remains the same through all her encounters. In a 
twisted manner, the birth of the subject heralds its death.  
Similarly, the privileging of quantity over quality entails the reduction 
of the potentialities of the body and eventually lets bodies to exist only as 
abstracted entities. Both of these phenomena are the constitutive elements of 
abstract space and relatively they can be institutionalized within the general 
practice of industrialism. Together with the general practice of industrialism a 
new “‘grammar of thought”51 emerges. This system of thought will eventually 
become deeply rooted in society and will be transformed into a pervasive form 
of perception. In regard to the “grammar of thought” that I am referring what is 
decisive is a shift from a repetition that produces difference to one that 
continually repeats the same.  
This is a property inherent in abstraction itself and it can be easily 
observed in the commodity which presents itself as detached from its 
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production process; or for that matter, in all the social phenomena that tend to 
conceal the dynamics of the relationships that generate them. Such a 
transformation is realized in abstract space by way of the substitution of spatial 
narratives by chains of signs, written texts, and images which interrupt the 
cumulative progression of narratives through the imposition of abstract rules. It 
is possible for a story to revolve around signs, meaning that, signs can play the 
role of markers in the unfolding of a narrative; yet it is not possible to compose 
a story solely out of signs because the main tendency of signs is towards 
freezing that which they signify.  
The same rule applies also to the images. Wim Wenders has pointed out 
to the necessity of and difficulty in resisting the dominance of the image per se 
while trying to compose a narrative in visual form.52 He explains that in his 
movies there had been moments when he deliberately discarded an impressive 
image for the sake of sustaining the unity and meaningfulness of the story. A 
dominant image has the power to halt the narrative in a meaningless way. That 
is to say, it creates a rupture in the story which does not usually open up a new 
path to think through, but simply proposes the detached image as the ultimate 
truth in which it is very hard for the subject not to lose herself.  
Without the existence of constantly evolving identities that feed upon 
narratives there only remain abstract rules that force the subject to make 
pseudo-choices between ready-made categories. Such is the case in non-places 
whose impact on urban life is becoming more severe from day to day, not just 
because they have proven to be unavoidable sites but also because they have 
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started to become very influential regarding the organization of their 
surroundings. Signs which populate the non-places cannot be looked upon as 
the innocent signifiers of an already constituted social reality; rather they play 
an essential role in the institutionalization of abstract rules in space. In non-
places, the body is totally absorbed into the contractual realm of the sign; 
meaning that it is transported from its qualified and qualifying space to the 
enclosed space of conventional rules in which energies, gestures and traces 
yield their place to actions that oscillate between the binary oppositions 
(yes/no, permission/prohibition, innocent/guilty) constitutive of the legal 
system. One of the main reasons why non-places have such an impoverishing 
impact on subjectivity is this absence of narrativity that defines these places. 
In “anthropological places” people can articulate their positions in 
regard to events and practices only through representing these to themselves at 
the symbolic level through narratives. Relatively the absence of narrativity also 
entails emptying the space of the disputes, conflicts, discussions, and 
negotiations that re-occur in anthropological places every time decisions 
concerning positions have to be made. But in actuality, this is not an empty 
space; rather it is a space where abstraction and an institutional logic reign. The 
signs that organize action in non-places are direct representatives of 
institutional laws and; thus, what they reflect back to the individual is her own 
subjectivity defined by the terminology of these institutions. Consequently, in 
non-places what lies at the center of subjective experience is this 
institutionalized individual.  
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THE CLOSURE OF THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE 
 
 
My overall intention in this thesis is to demonstrate that the highly abstracted 
public spaces of the contemporary world (non-places), despite their apparent 
roots in the historical spaces of early modernity, constitute a radical break with 
the latter in terms of the mode of experience they give rise to. In order to 
analyze the mode of experience that is peculiar to the postindustrial era and its 
abstract spaces I have focused, in the second chapter, on the separation affected 
between the conceptions of space and representational spaces and the 
consequent transformation of space from the locus of experience into a 
medium of power that nullifies attempts of appropriation on the part of the 
subject.  
I have tried to explain with recourse to certain Benjaminian notions that 
the primacy achieved by the immobilized representations which subject life to 
their abstract rules has resulted in the fading away of a specific mode of 
experience; that is, a mode of experience in which the subject and the object 
(depending on the context, may be read as the thing, the past, or space) 
constantly deconstruct and reconstruct each other within a mutual relationship. 
In this mode of relationship, the subject less projects her pre-given perceptions 
and conceptions onto the object than lets the thing to question her identity, to 
be reshaped through what this particular relationship presents her. Here the aim 
is not so much to use the thing as a means to reaching exact knowledge as to 
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produce an “approximate meaning” that is always open to change through a 
dialogue with it. What is at stake is an unending translation process: The 
subject makes the thing a part of her meaning system which, in turn, challenges 
the limits of this signification process, rearticulating its content and form. 
Today we can no longer talk about such a mode of relationship 
sustained with the world. Rather, the mode of the relationship the subject will 
form with things, time, and space is now determined by various social 
structures with their fixed representations and codes, with the multitude of 
messages, images, and signs they disseminate. If in an earlier phase of 
modernity social structures such as commerce, law, and science had functioned 
as mediators between the subject and the object, opening up multifarious paths 
for the individuals to relate to the world, then, in the postindustrial era, these 
structures have been transformed into the real subjects of a formalized 
experience with abstract rules into which they then draw in the subject. Stated 
differently, if in the historical times and spaces, through the guidance of 
conceptual thinking which found concrete form in the way urban life and labor 
was organized, knowledge and wealth was accumulated, people were realizing 
themselves as communities with potentialities, then in the era of ‘accumulation 
for accumulation’s sake’, these objective powers, as they have become the new 
subjects, translate these potentialities into capacities, enforcing the objects as 
well as the subjects into fixed and abstract identities.  
This shift of agency, and the reshaping of the individual as the effect of 
an experience of which she had been hitherto the subject correspond to what 
Benjamin calls the “decay of experience” which, in actuality, does not refer so 
much to the total arrest of experience as to a radical repositioning of the 
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putative subject of experience. In this chapter, my aim is to delineate the 
subjective consequences and mainly the cognitive aspects of this “decay of 
experience”. I would argue that the process of the “expropriation of 
experience”, and as part and parcel of it what could be termed the “automation 
of meaning”, not only has a history in social space, but also it partly arises out 
of the relations constituted with space. Therefore, my questions concerning the 
issue of meaning, its production process and subject, together with the nature 
of the process of understanding in the present world, will revolve around space, 
especially non-places, both as a product and as a force productive of 
subjectivities.  
Non-places emerge in this context as emblematic figures since they 
exhibit the latest point that has been reached in the abstraction of space; in this 
sense they function like the laboratories of the postindustrial world, presenting 
sterile areas in which the means of the modern loci of power for enhancing 
their efficacy are put to operation/test with the strictest of calculations and 
planning. They are the X-rays of today’s fulfilled human life, exhibiting the 
loss of reflectivity and the automation of agency which are definitive of the 
dominant mode of experience in all their impenetrable transparency.   
 
“Code of Space” and the Formation of the Community: 
 
In analyzing the role of spatial organization in the shift from an experience that 
strives towards the production of a communal meaning to an abstracted 
experience which foils the subject as an agent, we again come across the 
concept of “code of space”. Previously, I have indicated that the term refers to 
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the production of a unifying practice, and a language adequate to that practice, 
that transforms the urban realm from the agglomeration of disparate parts into 
an all-encompassing context. Such an urban context, whose presence is limited 
to certain social spaces that took shape under specific historical conditions such 
as the Renaissance town, does not only enable each part that it embodies to 
find a specific location  within its confines but also engenders the formation of 
a “relational paradigm” between these various spatial elements. Thus following 
the establishment of a code of space in the Renaissance period, the “town 
ceases to evolve ‘after the fashion of a continuous narrative’, adding one 
building after another, an extension to a street, or another square to those 
already in existence. From now on each building, each addition was politically 
conceived; each innovation modified the whole, and each ‘object’ – as though 
it had hitherto been somehow external – came to affect the entire fabric”53.  
Here, we are speaking of a time in which conceptual thinking has arisen 
as an effective force that disrupts the unconscious flow of spatial practice and 
organizes social life in accordance with the specific rules of a given paradigm, 
but we cannot argue that the paradigm in question threatens the livelihood of 
the everyday realm since what we are mentioning is itself still an alive context 
that is rearticulated through its relation with every new element that enters its 
confines. Although conceptions now play an important role in the production 
of space they have not yet been transformed into deadly weapons that subject 
the whole of life to abstract rules. Rather, the code in question is constituted 
through the mutual relationship between the representations of space and 
representational spaces. In contrast to a fixed point of view which discards that 
                                                 
53 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 272. 
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which exceeds the limits of its frame, this urban code not only let particularities 
exist but it also renders possible the generation of difference. Historically 
designating the passage from rural space to abstract space, historical space with 
its code differs radically from both in terms of the social life and experience it 
generates.  
Every space, regardless of the historical period it belongs to, exists prior 
to the introduction of the individual and in this sense it presents itself as an 
obstacle, or as a set of rules that are hard to transgress. These rules do not have 
to be declared, but the user finds them, even if she cannot exactly name them, 
always already sedimented in the structure and forms of space, in the functions 
it puts to use. In a rural society in which the relationship between the soil and 
the inhabitants is almost immediate the individual has not much chance but to 
obey the given rules, to act accordingly. What is referred to is a society which 
has witnessed neither the accumulation of wealth nor that of knowledge, and 
thus a society in which human intervention to space, either by way of 
technological devices or by way of abstract thought, is very limited. 
Consequently, space, as well as the whole world, appears to the individual as 
something that should be participated in – hence everybody has a specific role 
that partly finds expression in the spatial organization – and not understood, 
acknowledged and not transformed. In abstract space, the signs of 
appropriation which are produced by professionals replace appropriation itself. 
In contrast to both, the code of space signifies a society in which the city is 
open to the transformations brought about by the performances of the 
inhabitants. 
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Lefebvre compares the town to a machine, indicating that, by virtue of 
the “extensions and elaborations of” the “spatial arrangements and the 
introduction of connections”, even in its earliest stages it carried the potential 
of giving rise to the automation of the production process. But he also adds that 
“it is something more, something better” than a machine: “a machine 
appropriated […] to the use of a social group”54. In the historical space of the 
late medieval-early modern times, automation emerges only as a potential; 
despite the establishment of “urban systems” that can function more or less on 
their own, despite the fact that now – by virtue of the accumulation of 
knowledge – plans and projects for one street, one building, or square 
constitute the basis for the production of the others, still reflective thinking 
arises as the major driving force behind both the production and the experience 
of space.  
Repetition does not yet generate sameness and each part retains its 
singularity, “perspectivizing” the “general”, but “in turn” depending on the 
general as the “foil against which its specificity becomes discernible.”55 
Moreover, what is called the “parts” of the city is not restricted to the immobile 
structures but also involves the acts and gestures of the inhabitants, the 
representations and symbols they produce, the thoughts they have in and about 
the city; in short, all those factors that endow the city with life, that render it 
experiencible. In this sense, the generation of a code of space corresponds to 
the formation of a community that can sustain its unity due to the constant 
reconfiguration of common practices – both discursive and non-discursive – 
without abolishing the specificity of the particulars. What is achieved in 
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historical space, as a result of socio-economic transformations and the 
consequent code that organizes space, is a society which is unified in its 
diversity.    
It can be argued that the hermeneutical circle, with the constant and 
mutual relationship it puts forth between the particulars and the whole, is the 
paradigm of understanding for such a community. Here, hermeneutics is taken 
as an approach to understanding which takes into consideration both the non-
identity and the interrelatedness of the particular and the general. 
Hermeneutical approach proceeds with the recognition that the particular gains 
meaning only within a specific context and that, in return, with the inclusion of 
every other particular element the context itself is reconfigured. And despite 
this interrelatedness, an analysis of the whole is not by itself enough to explain 
the part; neither can the part wholly expresses the general. The constant to-and-
fro relationship between the parts and the whole; “the circular movement 
between the particular and the general” whose aim is to reach understanding is 
set as the “overarching framework” of hermeneutics: “The part/whole circle 
governs all interpretative activity insofar ‘as the whole is understood from the 
parts, so the parts can be understood from the whole.’”56 As a result, 
understanding arises neither as the discovery of the relationships between the 
elements of an already given world, nor through participation in an 
unquestionable and universal reason, but as an “approximate meaning” that is 
produced precisely in the act of interpretation; as such it is a construction that 
will be the subject of deconstructions and reconstructions as long as the process 
of interpretation goes on.  
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Iser argues that hermeneutics could emerge as an important model of 
understanding only at a time when transcendental sources – either God or a 
universal reason –  could no longer account for the complexities of the socio-
political context: The qualitative changes in life have nullified the potential of 
any given framework that assimilates all the elements to its system, while at the 
same time resisting to the changes that can be brought about by these elements, 
to operate as the ground of meaning. As these transcendental authorities that 
needed neither justification nor explanation slowly faded away, the subject and 
the community emerged as the competing sources of meaning. The 
hermeneutic circle serves as a model that illuminates the bond this community 
forms with space and history as well as the mode of the relationship that is 
constituted between the members of the community.  
All of these relations are marked by a “liminal distance” around which 
they revolve. The concept of liminal distance – which is central to 
hermeneutics – exhibits a close affinity to Benjamin’s notion of “aura” which 
constitutes the backbone of the mode of experience peculiar to the community. 
Both of these terms designate the excess of the particular, its resistance to 
being assimilated by the general. Confronted with this irreducible difference, 
the only thing interpretation can do is to try to minimize the gap through 
employing a reflective thought that strives to construct creative connections 
between the parts and the whole. In such a community, which is underwritten 
with the consciousness that a total understanding of the world can never be 
attained, neither history is perceived as a picture that yields itself readily to the 
viewpoints of the present world, nor lived space is reduced to conceived space, 
and nor individuals are exhausted by the norms of the society. 
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The “Decay of Experience” and the Subject of Non-places: 
 
If the hermeneutic circle with the constant to-and-fro relationship it sustains 
between the particulars and the general served as the model of understanding in 
historical space whose subject was the community, then, it is no surprise that in 
abstract space, which is defined by the sovereignty of an objective ratio and the 
dissolution of the community, the hermeneutic circle has lost its context of 
application. Rather, in the increasingly abstracted public spaces, a vicious 
circle, which replaces the hermeneutic circle as the model of understanding, 
eliminates the “liminal distance” and subjugates the particular to the laws of an 
immobile code. The domination of the particular by the general signifies both 
the decay of the aura and the exclusion of “otherness” from the sphere of 
meaning. Consequently, the substitution of this mutual relationship by the 
hegemony of the code heralds the shrinking down of the space in which 
meaning is produced, that is, the loss of reflectivity.  
In non-places, which are the main settings of the postindustrial world, 
meaning is not the outcome of a reflective thought which attempts to build 
bridges between the particular and its context – bridges that reconstitute both –, 
paths each of which provides just a possibility among other possibilities, but 
the product of a logic which detaches particulars from their present context and 
relocates them along an abstract plane, and then reconstitutes their 
interrelationships as well as their relation with the whole. If hermeneutics is an 
attempt at sustaining the relation between the parts and the whole through 
producing possible connections which all end up at an “approximate meaning”, 
just as Benjamin says in relation to the story (and the storyteller) that its main 
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reason is to give “counsel”, and that “counsel” is more a “proposal concerning 
the continuation of a story which is just unfolding” than “an answer to a 
question”57, then, it should be acknowledged that here the consciousness that 
guides these attempts, or propositions, the awareness that an exact answer 
cannot be obtained is as important as the attempt itself. This consciousness 
does not only mark the relationship between the particulars and the general, but 
also signifies the critical attitude of thought towards its own operations.  
Defined by the absence of such a consciousness, the abstract logic that 
shapes understanding in non-places does not work towards the construction of 
crossroads that allow the coexistence of differences within a unifying context, 
but strives towards the production of a homogeneous social experience that 
renders the construction of such crossroads, or bridges, unnecessary. 
Differences are not totally excluded; but as I have indicated previously, they 
are “induced differences” which “remain within a set or system generated 
according to a particular law”58. The exertion of this logic to space gives rise to 
an abstract space that is increasingly homogenized due to its total subjection to 
the laws of specific social structures (such as industrialization, commerce, and 
institutional power) but still fragmented, separated into pieces that no longer 
make up a unity.  
In this abstract space, not only poverty, ethnic identity, and refugees are 
localized with the aims of both marginalizing and controlling, but also 
potentials; i.e. attempts at creating a different space, are confined to the limits 
of a prescribed area so that their interaction with the overall space is blocked 
and in time they lose their identities. In the same vein, non-places, as the 
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extreme instances of abstract space, are partly defined by the overabundance of 
messages, signs, and images. Yet these are not the joint products of 
representations of space and representational spaces, but the by-products of an 
abstract code. Therefore, despite the appearance they present of a multitude 
and diversity, in actuality, they function as the tools of this code that swallows 
up particularities.  
To the extent that such a logic is employed in the production process of 
space, it also affects the urban experiences of the “users”; that is, the relation 
they form in and through space with history, with others, and with themselves. 
Non-places “do not integrate the earlier places: instead they are listed, 
classified, promoted to the status of ‘places of memory’, and assigned to a 
circumscribed and specific position”59. The subjects of these places, which are 
in a sense banned from social use and which allow the mediation of only 
objective powers, are also the targets of this enlisting and categorization, that 
is, they are obliged to consent to abstract identities with predetermined 
qualities. Here, a formalized experience whose subjects are abstract categories 
is buttressed with an objective meaning that is produced outside the 
individuals.  
The particularities of both events and individuals are erased by the 
totality; it is no longer the changing array of parts that constantly reconstitute 
the totality, which in turn contextualizes them. On the contrary now an 
abstracted code – which, despite its unified appearance and its “homogenizing 
tendency” includes the local within its operations – is what determines the 
character of the singularities. What it lost is the liminal space between the 
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individual and the social structure in which she finds meaning. It can even be 
argued that in the postindustrial world, the individuals and the events are no 
longer the particularities that make up a whole; rather they are determined by 
an abstract totality/code that suspends or even eliminates their singularities and 
diminishes potentialities from the beginning. Rather, the particularities are now 
institutional regulations, rules set by the operations of the transnational capital, 
commercial treaties, legislations, etc.; which means that what now constitutes 
the whole, the parts, are either “concrete abstractions” (“including money, 
commodities, and the exchange of material goods”) or “‘pure’ forms” (such as 
“exchange, language, signs, equivalences, reciprocities, contracts, and so 
on”)60; that is they are the perfect antithesis of the particular.  
Augé argues that, besides other forms of excess, the supermodern 
situation is defined by the excess of the individual61: However, it should be 
taken into consideration that this excess does not so much refer to the 
difference-producing potentiality of the subject as to her isolation from a living 
social context. This isolation, which is to a large extent determined by the 
nature of the media that organizes both the flow of information in these places 
and the form of the communication with the passenger/customer, passes for her 
individuality; the detachment from the socio-cultural context creates the 
illusion of a self which furnishes her own identity whereas in actuality such a 
detachment represents the fact that the significance producing performance of 
the self is substituted with a one-way relationship (the domination of  lived 
space by an immobilized code) that discards the contribution of the user. The 
space of the non-places is one “where the habitué of supermarkets, slot 
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machines and credits cards communicates wordlessly, through gestures, with 
an abstract, unmediated commerce; a world thus surrendered to solitary 
individuality, to the fleeting, the temporary, the ephemeral.”62 In this world, the 
‘I’ stands alone in the midst of a multiplicity of messages, images, and signs 
that present her back to her, yet this time articulated along the terms of an 
abstract logic. 
 
A world of qualities without a man has arisen, of experiences without 
the person who experiences them, and it almost looks as though 
ideally private experience is a thing of the past […]. Probably the 
dissolution of the anthropocentric point of view which for such a long 
time considered man to be the center of the universe but which have 
been fading away since centuries, has finally arrived at the ‘I’ itself, 
for the belief that the most important things about experience is the 
experiencing, or of action in the doing, is beginning to strike most 
people as naïve.63 
 
In non-places, the agency of the production of meaning shifts from the 
community to the media, the advertising and tourism agencies, which although 
do not take hold of space as a totality as institutional power needs to do, 
collaborate with these institutional loci of power in what has previously been 
named the “expropriation of experience” and the relevant a-humanization of 
meaning through flooding these emptied out spaces with the images and signs 
whose nature and interrelationship they control. These signs and images are 
qualitatively different from those that furnish the communal experience of 
“anthropological places” since instead of enabling the continuity of a spatial 
narrative that sustains unity while at the same time generating difference; they 
dismantle the narrative and transfer its elements onto an abstract plane. If the 
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first are the products of a lived space, then, the latter are the producers of 
“imaginary places”.  
Hence, as Augé remarks, “certain places exist only through the words 
that evoke them, and in this sense they are non-places, or rather, imaginary 
places: banal utopias, clichés.”64 What is achieved through the intervention of 
these words is the absence of the place from itself: They detach the place 
(Tahiti and Marrakech are the examples that Augé gives) from its socio-
political and historical context, dissimulate the power relations that have 
produced the place, and represent it only as an image. Tahiti, as the total sum 
of all the advertisements that mention it and the images that depict it, is not so 
different from a commodity that appears on the shop window. And it is even 
something less than a commodity because while the commodity still retains its 
use value; Tahiti, or for that matter all those places which are colonized by 
tourism, as it appears on the billboards and television screens, is solely meant 
for the gaze. It is only a surface that bears a multiplicity of signs, images, etc. 
that transmute it from a lived space into an imaginary one:    
 
The ‘world of signs’ is not merely the space occupied by signs (by 
object-signs and sign-objects). It is also that space where the Ego no 
longer relates to its own nature, to the material world, or even to the 
‘thingness’ of things (commodities), but only to things bound to their 
signs and indeed ousted and supplanted by them. The sign-bearing ‘I’ 
no longer deals with anything but other bearers of signs.65 
 
The commodification of places is intricately related with what Lefebvre 
describes as the manipulation of representational spaces by representations of 
space; that is, after the divorce between the two, as the representations of space 
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begin to gain ascendancy and determine the dominant forms, functions, and 
structure space will take – and, by implication, the corresponding mode of 
experience – those places which had for a long time reserved their 
representational quality  are slowly subjected to the laws of conceived space. 
That is, those places which has been previously open to appropriation and 
imagination, and which has thus functioned as the loci of the creation of 
symbols and difference, are now given over to the abstract rules of 
industrialism and commodification.  
This is the case in the Mediterranean coasts which, on the one hand, 
give the appearance of representational spaces due to the fact that they embody 
a lifestyle which is situated symbolically at the opposite pole of the mode of 
life produced through industrial work; yet, on the other hand, have direct 
relations with the “tour-operators, bankers, and entrepreneurs of places such as 
London and Hamburg”66 which work hard to sustain this appearance. The signs 
of appropriation and imagination remain intact but the user of space is now 
deprived of the potential of appropriation. If previously meaning and symbols 
belonging to and emanating from a space had been the collective product of the 
community, or even of those people sharing life in a given place for a specific 
period of time, now these are substituted by the signs and images produced by 
the production companies, advertising and tourism agencies, which have 
replaced narration and memory as the mediators between the subject and space.  
The existence of such a restraint on communal appropriation does not 
necessarily imply that every subject who uses these places will feel herself 
powerless and entrapped; unless, of course, what is at issue is a refugee 
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literally imprisoned in a camp. On the contrary, the passenger/customer, 
depending on the level of luxury of the place, may even feel herself to be more 
“free” than ever. This is mostly because of the fact that the powers governing 
these abstract places are aware of the fact that they have to create the illusion 
that domination is not the sole mode of relationship sustained with space. The 
reality that within the conditions that have been produced by late capitalism 
space not only functions as the most general medium of exchange but that it 
has itself also been transformed into a commodity cannot be concealed from 
the user; within her daily practice the subject is well aware of the fact that even 
what she calls home is the exact copy of her neighbor’s; that, by virtue of urban 
planning and an architecture of abstraction houses have been transformed into 
identical cells.  
A more recent step towards the rendering identical of each one of these 
private cells has been the entrance of a television into every household which 
subjects everyone to “…a mixture of images (news, advertising, and fiction) of 
which neither the presentation nor the purpose is identical, at least in principle, 
but which assemble before eyes a universe that is relatively homogeneous in its 
diversity.”67. All of these factors indicate that even that place which had been 
the last refuge of the representational mode of relationship formed with space; 
i.e. home, has in the end surrendered to the logic of abstraction. What we call 
non-places are no longer restricted to the airports, highways, hotels, 
amusement parks or refugee camps. People now pass from even those places 
which they dwell in since they are no longer the real subjects of those places. 
Another example that demonstrates the hegemony of signs is the airport: The 
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airports are planned and constructed as empty surfaces with no curves, or 
squares that promote the meeting and interaction of people. Rather than spatial 
characteristics, it is the signs of capitalism that determine the meeting places of 
the passengers. People meet in Starbucks not because it is designed as an 
attractive place, but because they have no other choice. In spatial terms, 
Starbucks has no specificity; there pertains no spatial quality to it that 
distinguishes it from the rest of the place. 
In both of these examples we witness the two apparent steps that work 
towards the abstraction of space; the first is the emptying out of space in 
accordance with the dominant conception of space that represents it as an 
empty medium (the geometric formant), and the second is the flooding of this 
empty space which is rendered indifferent to the particularity of every 
individual, act, and event with a multitude of signs, images, and messages (the 
visual formant).68  All former meanings, signification systems, are evacuated 
from this space, but still it is not an empty space. Alienation has no counterpart 
in the postindustrial world. On the contrary, the closing of the hermeneutic 
circle and the shift from a society that is unified in its diversity to one that is 
“homogeneous in its diversity” signify the end of all alienation. As the “liminal 
space” between the particular and the general erodes, every word, act, or event 
is pinned to a definite meaning that leaves no space for ambiguity. And the 
function of the signs and images, which do the pinning, is to enable the 
subjects to “misrecognize” – but still recognize – themselves on this abstract 
plane.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this thesis I have tried to explore, on the one hand, how non-places, the 
settings of the post-industrial world, affect and reconstruct subjective 
experience, and, on the other hand; how subjective experience reproduces itself 
in and through the organization of that space. As I have indicated in the 
introductory chapter, I did not discuss the mode of subjective experience of 
abstract space as a detached phenomenon, but tried to analyze it within the 
context of a more general experience of the post-industrial world; a world 
which has been becoming more and more automized since the process of the 
transfer of agency from subjects and communities to objective powers has 
began. By this transfer of agency I mean the exclusion of the subject as an 
agent from the production process of her own experience; the fixing of selves – 
as well as things – to identities specified by a variety of discursive and non-
discursive practices and the consequent deprivation of the potential of both 
being able to produce difference and being open to change. This transfer of 
agency, which is explicitly observable in the workings of modern science 
which redefine the form of the relationship between the object and the subject, 
in the increasingly complicated machines of post-industrialism which reduce 
the worker to a finger who pushes the button, resurfaces in the organization of 
urban space in multifarious forms.  
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Under urbanization, space becomes increasingly automized. With the 
introduction of complex mechanisms of transportation, the urban systems that 
distribute electricity, water and similar needs it becomes an objective force that 
organizes, uses, and reproduces energy. This huge machine, which has been 
made possible by the materialization in space of vast amounts of accumulation 
of knowledge – technology – is superimposed by a whole set of representations 
deriving from various discourses which organize our ways of 
being/thinking/acting as citizens in the urban realm. This much of 
expropriation of spatial experience had already been realized in the modern 
city and this structure is still a significant layer that determines the conditions 
of living in the city. However, with the introduction of the non-places our 
mode of being-in-the-urban realm is rendered even more abstract. The modern 
city had already located the subjects on an abstract plane in which they had 
been redefined according to the terms and rules of the state, transnational 
capital, commerce, law, etc. Non-places subject space to a second process of 
abstraction by distributing all over it the latest products of the representations 
of space such as high-tech devices, signs and images. It seems as if as we pass 
through these places, which are already meant for passing through, we also 
pass through a process of identity construction. We lend our selves, our 
identities interwoven with stories, symbols, and memories which we had 
brought from our pasts to this supposedly depthless surface which detaches us 
from the context of ourselves, deprives us of our qualities, transfigures us 
according to its own conceptions, and represents us back to us.  
It should be taken into consideration that the term non-place does not 
simply designate places with definitive characteristics such as the airports, 
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shopping malls, or highways. It also designates a historically specific mode of 
organizing space which has consequences for the ways we experience space; 
relate to ourselves, others, and things in space. In this thesis, I have tried to 
explore the conditions that made such an abstract organization possible and the 
consequences of such a space for subjective experience. It can be said that as I 
traced my way from the historical space of the early modernity to the abstract 
space of ultra-modernity the Benjaminian notion of experience (Erfahrung) 
began to leave its way slowly to another mode of experience; which has more 
in common with Foucault’s notion of experience. Meaning that, the mode of 
subjective experience in which the subject and the thing related to each other 
through the mediation of imagination, narratives, and symbols and in this way 
constantly transgressed their limits left its way to a mode of experience in 
which mutual interaction is eliminated due to the fact that both the self and the 
thing have been objectified and confined into clear-cut categories and 
positions; that they have turned into the effects of objective structures that 
constitute experience in their names.  
In searching out the conditions that made this transformation possible, 
I, first of all, dwelled into the notion of time. In the chapter named “Spatio-
Temporal Perception” I introduced time and space as two interwoven and 
indispensable grounds of experience. I have proceeded with the basic 
assumption that time is always already inherent in space; that it is time which 
renders space livable. And, in return, space plays an important role in the 
organization of time. With reference to Lefebvre I have suggested that the 
major changes inflicted upon space affect the way time is conceptualized and 
experienced. As the impact of the objective forces intensifies under modernity, 
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time slowly loses its ability to transform space from a lifeless texture into a 
living context. The dominant loci of power under modernity, such as the state, 
industrialism, and capitalism attempt to seize control over space, to create their 
own space which is infused with their representations and conceptualizations, 
which puts to use their means for reaching their designated ends.  The end 
product is abstract space which functions as a tool in re-conceptualizing time in 
accordance with the laws and aims of these loci of power. As the desire for 
endless accumulation becomes a rule under capitalism, time is reduced to a 
source of profit. The highly advanced transportation systems, modern-
machinery operating in factories and on the land … all of these are meant for 
extracting, or at least saving, as much money as possible out of time, for 
maximizing productivity by speeding up time. Moreover the factor of speed 
does not remain limited within the sphere of production. Instead, it becomes an 
element of the everyday life. Due to the overabundance of stimuli, we react to 
everything in the urban realm with the same speed. Speed turns into an even 
more influential element in the way we perceive and experience space in the 
non-places such as the airports. No significance is attached to any one of those 
messages, signs, and images that flood these places; they just indifferently fill 
in identical moments. And this breaking up of time into disconnected and 
repetitive moments results in the perception of space as a collage that cannot 
make up either a context or a narrative.    
In this sense the shrinkage of time has consequences also for the decay 
of representational spaces; which is one of the subjects of the following chapter 
– “The Actualization of Representations of Space” – in which I first of all 
categorically separated representations of space from the representational 
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spaces and then tried to analyze the process by which representations of space 
achieve almost total domination over representational spaces within the 
conditions of abstract space. And I lastly mentioned the consequences of this 
domination for subjective experience. To repeat, “representations of space” 
refer to “the dominant conception of space within a specific historical period 
which arises out of the collaboration between knowledge and power”69. The 
most prevalent representations of space in the post-industrial world portray 
space as a homogeneous entity, as an empty container that accepts whatever is 
put in it, as the product of a vision, etc. in conformity with the uses the state, 
transnational capital, the military power and other forms of effective power 
want to make out of space. The tools of these representations are all the plans 
and projects of urban designers and architects, maps and sketches, images 
emanating from the billboards and screens, and messages and signs which 
reconstitute the users’ relationship with space along the terms of an abstract 
thought. In other words, these products of representations carry down this 
abstract thought embedded in the representations to the realm of everyday life; 
they turn it into something that can be practiced and reproduced everyday by 
the inhabitants. 
On the other hand, the term “representational spaces” designates “the 
space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate. It overlays 
physical space, making symbolic use of its objects.”70 In this sense, 
representational spaces are nourished by the memories of the users and the 
narratives through which they connect to each other and to the place. It is the 
quality of the time they spend in that place which endows the place with 
                                                 
69 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 18.   
70 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 39. 
 73 
significance; it is the diverse histories they constantly embed in this place 
which transforms the place into the bedrock of experience. And it is because of 
this elemental dependence of representational spaces on history that the 
strategies of the representations of space – the reduction of time to the total 
sum of disconnected moments, speed of life which presents the world as 
something to be immediately reacted to rather than reflected upon – constitute 
such a serious threat to their existence. Representations reduce a process of 
becoming stretched out in time to a static presence; and in this way they seek to 
unite and control the center and the periphery, the local, the national, and the 
transnational under the same abstract logic which is represented as the 
reflection of an essential truth. The projections of the representations aim to 
abolish difference; the city may be fragmented into multiple parts according to 
functions, the places of work may be strictly detached from those of leisure, 
and so on. But overall, all these separated zones are organized according to the 
same rules. On the other hand, the representational spaces are the local 
responses to the homogenizing tendencies of the representations of space; 
through the memories and narratives that connect inhabitants to each other and 
to their space, the concreteness and particularity of the space is sustained.  
As space becomes increasingly abstracted and falls prey to the laws of 
reproducibility, repetition, and homogenization these historical mediators 
between space and its inhabitants start to fade away. Imagination, symbols, and 
memory, in their attempt to reach out to the object of experience, preserve the 
distance of the thing. Meaning that, these modes of relating to the thing 
acknowledge, and do not attempt to violate, the aura of the thing. This is the 
distance needed for reflecting on the thing, for contemplating it, being open to 
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its particularity and eventually forming a meaningful narrative out the relation 
engaged with it. The annihilation of this distance implies by itself the “decay of 
experience” in the Benjaminian sense. The chains of signs, messages, and 
images which replace memories and narratives in abstract space destroy this 
“unique distance” which indicates the annihilation of a process of mutual 
transformation between the subject and the object and the possibility of 
producing difference. In this abstract space, the signs, and images of 
institutional law, transnational capital, state power, etc. transfigure places as 
static entities with pre-determined identities and functions. 
Lastly, in chapter “The Closure of the Hermeneutic Circle” I tried to 
analyze the cognitive consequences of this “decay of experience”. Here, I 
focused more on the objectification that people and things are subjected to and 
the consequent loss of agency on their part in the production of both experience 
and meaning. In non-places, experience is rather produced by objective forces 
which have at their hand image/sign-producing sectors such as advertisement 
and tourism and it is only after the production of this external experience that 
things and people are drawn into this abstract sphere and attributed specified 
roles and identities. The plans, sketches, designs, and all other images 
protruding one after another from the screens and billboards fabricate a 
character for the passenger; they determine the possibilities she has, the 
appearance she takes on, her desires, her mode of relating with herself, others, 
things and history. In short, these images, signs, and messages work towards 
the identification of the subject with the “average citizen” of an abstract code.  
I argued that in this objectified reality, it is neither the subjects nor the 
relations they form with space and things in space that produces meaning. 
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Rather in the abstracted places of the post-industrial world, the sole source of 
meaning is this abstract code. In order to open up this argument, I traced my 
way from the “code of space” – that is, “a unifying practice and a language 
adequate to that practice”71 peculiar to a specific time, space, and a community 
– to the totalizing and homogenizing code prevailing in abstract space. I 
suggested that in the early modern town where abstraction had not yet made its 
apogee meaning was produced out of the interaction between representational 
spaces and representations of space. Meaning that, here, the representations 
provided the general framework which the community worked upon to render 
concrete. There existed a signification system common to the whole 
community, yet, on the other hand, members of this community could 
participate individually in the constitution of this meaning system through 
sharing her particularity with it. This was also valid for the urban realm itself; 
despite the existence of a common code which determined the overall 
organization of the city, every new piece of architecture could transform the 
whole. Therefore I suggested that the hermeneutical circle, which is method of 
weaving paths and crossroads between the particular and the general in order to 
reach at an approximate meaning, could serve as a model for both the 
production of meaning and understanding in this society. However, the same is 
not true for the post-industrial world and its abstract space.  In the present 
world, meaning is automized. An abstract code assimilates all particularities to 
itself and presents prescriptions of meaning. In this context, no particularity 
retains to a single building since it echoes the law of the abstract code and in 
this sense a repetition of all the other buildings .Neither do people need to 
                                                 
71 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford; Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 42.  
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indulge in a constant search for meaning, to be involved in a permanent process 
of translation in their attempts to produce meaning out of the world since the 
connections that need to be drawn between things, the meaning they need to 
derive is already given to them through the operations of signs and images. 
Overall, it can be said that this thesis has stayed at the level of an 
exploration; that, it has been an attempt at understanding the objective forces 
that shape our identities and define our relationships in ultra-modernity. I have 
laid out a general picture which portrays our distance from being the subjects 
of our own experience and in this sense our lack of freedom as long as what we 
call freedom resides in the possibilities of becoming something other than 
oneself through a transforming and transformative relationship formed with the 
world. It seemed important to me to search for the sources of our absence from 
ourselves as the subjects of our own experience in the organization of abstract 
space. Not because I thought this abstract space and its code to be the sole 
power that generates our lack of agency. But, because I think that our space – 
together with time – is one of the few things that we are so eager to accept as 
“given”. The various constructions and strategies the dominant power relations 
put to operation in this space call for an analysis so that this taken for granted 
space can be stripped off its illusionary transparency. Such a task exceeded the 
limits of this thesis, but I think it should be dealt with as the object of a more 
comprehensive study. Such a study could also explore methods and models for 
understanding this abstract code according to the rules of which space and life 
is organized. In this thesis I could only make the observation that the 
hermeneutical circle as a model of understanding had lost its validity in the 
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post-industrial world, but I could not propose another model for decoding the 
operations of the reigning abstract code.    
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